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ABSTRACT
Under existing law spouses are jointly and severally liable for taxes
assessed with respect to their joint income tax returns. As a result, the IRS
may pursue either spouse for any taxes owed on those returns. Because
Congress was concerned that the IRS was seeking taxes from the "wrong"
spouse under the joint and several liability regime, it expanded relief for
"innocent" spouses in 1998. Many critics of this relief complain that, as it is
applied, the statute offers too little relief to spouses, generally wives, who
sign returns while being deceived or compelled by their mates. However,
there has been no empirical study of whether the current relief is, in fact,
what Congress intended. This article fills the void by first evaluating the
provision's legislative history to determine what relief Congress intended to
provide when it acted in 1998. The article then examines the 444 cases
appealing for relief under this provision in order to evaluate whether judges
are deciding cases invoking the provision consistent with that congressional
objective. This article's empirical study of the success and failure of the
innocent spouse provision from Congress's perspective concludes that the
courts are generally applying innocent spouse relief as Congress intended.
I. INTRODUCTION ................................. ..... 630
I. THE LAW IN DEVELOPMENT ....................... ..... 635
A. Background ................................... 636
B. Congressional Action ....................... ..... 639
III. THE LAW IN PLAY ............................... ..... 645
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. The author
would like to acknowledge the comments on previous drafts of this article from the
2011 Law and Society Conference, the 2011 Critical Tax Conference, the 2011
Junior Tax Conference, and the University of Cincinnati faculty workshop, in
particular Chris Bryant, Paul Caron, Kristin Kalsem, Francine Lippman, Susie
Morse, and Michael Solimine, as well as comments from Dorothy Brown, Margaret
Drew, and Carl Smith and for the financial support of the Harold C. Schott
Foundation.
629
HeinOnline  -- 12 Fla. Tax Rev. 629 2012
630 Florida Tax Review [Vol.12:8
A. Mechanics of the Study...........................647
1. Choice of Courts..........................648
2. Breakdown ofProvisions .................... 654
3. Summary...............................660
B. Characteristics ofRequesting Spouse ................. 661
1. Sex .................... ............... 661
2. Marital Status...........................663
3. Other Characteristics......................665
4. Summary...............................668
C. Nature of the Tax Burden ......................... 669
1. Unfair Burden...........................669
a. Source ofLiability ............ 669
b. Knowledge ofLiability ............... 673
c. Benefit from Liability ................ 679
2. Crushing Burden.........................685
a. Economic Hardship .................. 685
b. Not Borne by Others ................. 689
3. Summary...............................692
D. Characteristics ofNon-Requesting Spouse ............. 693
1. Abusive ........................ ........... 693
2. Legally Obligated Under State Law................. 698
3. Intervening ............................... 702
4. Summary ..................... .............. 704
V. CONCLUSION. .................................................. 705
PART 1. INTRODUCTION
When Kathleen Sullivan married Joseph Alioto in 1978, she
probably thought her future was secure.1I She was the well-educated daughter
of the owner of the New England Patriots and he was a prominent antitrust
attorney who had spent eight years as mayor of San Francisco. 2The couple
"4enjoyed a loving, supportive, and harmonious marital relationship, and
Mayor Alioto believed it was his absolute duty to care and provide for his
family.",3 However, after Joseph's death in 1998 that duty was shown to have
gone unmet.
Although when they married Kathleen knew that Joseph was fighting
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), little did Kathleen know when they filed
their joint tax returns each year that Joseph was not paying their federal
1. Alioto v. Commissioner, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 63, 64, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-
185 at 986.
2. Id., 96 T.C.M. (CCH) n.3, 65 n.7, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-185 at 985-87.
3. Id., 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 63, 64, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-185 at 986.
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taxes.4 Only when handling Joseph's estate did Kathleen learn of their total
tax liability.' By that time, she had been a homemaker to the wealthy
attorney and politician for twenty years. For the next decade Kathleen fought
this tax liability that, by the time of her final resolution, totaled $1,985,511.6
The IRS argued that Kathleen was liable for this tax because she had
signed the couple's joint returns. The Internal Revenue Code provides that
every time a married couple signs a joint return, each spouse becomes jointly
and severally liable for payinp tax on the income that is reported, or failed to
be reported, on that return. This means that if a couple chooses to file
jointly, the IRS can collect from either spouse the taxes due. Spouses remain
jointly and severally liable even after they divorce or one spouse dies.
Congress has created several exceptions to this joint and several
liability, and it was an exception in section 6015 of the Code that ultimately
provided Kathleen relief. As discussed in Part II of this article, Congress
intended this relief for wives who were unfairly left oppressive tax burdens
by their divorced or deceased husbands. Primary responsibility for granting
or denying this "innocent spouse" relief was given to the IRS, but the
judiciary was given oversight over administrative denials.9 Kathleen twice
appealed to courts before she finally won.lo
4. Id. At the time of their marriage Joseph was fighting the IRS over
charitable deductions. Alioto v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1147, T.C.M. (P-
H) 1 80,360. The couple also had "protracted negotiations" regarding their 1978
return. Alioto v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2133, T.C.M. (RIA) T 1994-051
at 94-235. The IRS satisfied the couple's 1993 and 1994 liabilities from Joseph's
estate. Kathleen had previously been granted innocent spouse relief for 1989, 1990,
and 1991 pursuant to a stipulated decision in docket No. 3013-95. Alioto, 96 T.C.M.
(CCH) 63, 66, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2008-185 at 990.
5. In Dec. 1996, the government seized over $2 million in community
property to satisfy prior tax obligations but Kathleen still thought the family's net
worth was over $16 million. Alioto, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 63, 65, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 208-
185 at 987.
6. Id., 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 63, 64, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-185 at 986.
7. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
8. I.R.C. § 6015; Alioto, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 63, 71, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-
185 at 997.
9. I.R.C. § 6015(e). The IRS created factors to consider when applying the
provision, and courts often incorporate these factors in their opinions. Rev. Proc.
2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. at 296, superseding Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447. The
IRS has recently updated the factors it will consider when applying section 6015(f).
Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309. This change does not affect the findings of the
study, although the revised factors should cause the IRS not to contest relief under
fact patterns in which they would have contested relief under Revenue Procedure
2003-61.Carl Smith argues that courts should not rely on the Treasury Department's
factors. Carlton M. Smith, Innocent Spouse: Let's Bury That "Inequitable" Revenue
Procedure, 131 TAX NOTES 1165 (2011) [hereinafter Smith, "Inequitable" Revenue
2012] 631
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That Kathleen was widowed and left with a staggering tax bill that
her husband's estate could not satisfy worked in favor of her claim for relief.
Moreover, the court concluded, "During the years in issue Mrs. Alioto
reasonably believed that Mayor Alioto was a man of wealth, a man who was
on top of everything, and a man in control."" Because she reasonably
expected Joseph to pay the taxes, the court placed all of the blame for the
unpaid tax on her husband.
Congress last liberalized the innocent spouse rules granting Kathleen
relief in 1998.12 That year, 95 percent of married couples filed jointly,
approximately 49 million couples of whom 1.25 million were assessed
additional taxes. 13 For some of those 1.25 million couples, the system is
thought to have failed because the liability for taxes owed was imposed on
the "wrong" spouse.14  This can happen for many reasons: The "right"
spouse is hard to locate, no longer has money to pay the tax, or has funds that
are harder to collect.
In 1998, the Senate's sponsor of section 6015 estimated that 50,000
women were held jointly and severally liable for their husbands, and the
Governor's Accounting Office estimated that 35,000 spouses were held
liable who had separated or divorced from the person with whom they had
filed.15 It was to help these spouses that Congress first enacted, and then
liberalized, innocent spouse relief.16 Since 1998, section 6015 contains three
means to relief: a limited equitable relief for those meeting statutory
requirements; an allocation of liability for divorced, widowed, or separated
spouses; and a general equitable relief to be granted by the Secretary of the
Treasury.
A review of cases invoking this innocent spouse relief provision
contributes to existing scholarship in two significant ways. First, it provides
an empirical study of one of the ten issues most litigated by the IRS. This is
valuable not only because of the issue itself but, more generally, empirical
Procedure]. The issue should not be whether the courts use the factors but how they
do so. To the extent courts give substance to the factors, they develop the law for the
IRS to apply.
10. Alioto, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 63, 64, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-185 at 986.
11. Id., 96 T.CM. (CCH) 63, 70, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2008-185 at 995.
12. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, § 3201(a), 112 Stat. 685, 734-40 (1998).
13. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON JOINT
LIABILITY AND INNOCENT SPOUSE ISSUES (1998), 9 [hereinafter REPORT ON JOINT
LIABILITY].
14. Id. at 21.
15. 144 CONG. REC. 4474 (1998); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/T-GGD-98-72, ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF
[hereinafter GAO, ALTERNATIVES].
16. See supra Part II.
[Vol. 12:8632
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research in taxation remains an under-developed area, despite an increased
focus on this type of research in recent years.' 7 Unlike prior empirical
research focused on statutory interpretation, judicial motivations, or taxpayer
responses, this study furthers the scholarly agenda by examining whether,
and to what extent, courts implement congressional intent as described in a
statutory provision's legislative history. This new focus offers a unique
ability to examine the operations of, and the interaction between, the
branches of the federal government.
For this purpose, Part II draws congressional intent from the
Congressional Record and committee reports. Although there are risks with
assuming these sources contain Congress's intent with respect to the
innocent spouse provision, the consistency of views expressed therein
suggests that there was a dominant vision of what this provision was
17. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2010 ANNuAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
414 (2011) [hereinafter NTA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT]. See also Michael J.
Bommarito 11 et al., An Empirical Survey of the Populations of U.S. Tax Court
Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAX REV. 523 (2011) [hereinafter Bommarito, Empirical
Survey]; Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the
History of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 971-72 (2004);
Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory
Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 325 (2001); Leandra
Lederman, Which Cases Go To Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure
to Settle, 49 CASE W. L. REV. 315 (1999); Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax
Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 365, 368 (1998); Nancy Staudt, Empirical Taxation, 13 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 1, 2 n.8, lists all empirical tax articles from 1993 to 2002.
18. For normative support of the use of legislative intent, see Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 32-33
(1985); Martin Redish & Theodore Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative
Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 Tul. L.
Rev. 803 (1994); Daniel Rodriguez & Barry Weingast, The Positive Political Theory
of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its
Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003). For a discussion of judges' decision-
making in tax cases, see Bommarito, supra note 17; Nancy Staudt et al., Judging
Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1911 (2004); Schneider,
supra note 17; Lederman, supra note 17; John Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a
Decent Respect for the Tax Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501 (1997); Michael A.
Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism " and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes,
51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996); Deborah Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation, 2 FLA.
TAX REV. 492 (1995) [hereinafter Geier, Interpreting]; Michael A. Livingston,
Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REV. 819 (1991); Lawrence Zelenack, Thinking about
Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986).
2012] 633
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intended to accomplish.19 The article then analyzes whether courts
effectively use that intent to apply the facts and circumstances tests laid out
in the statute.
Second, this article contributes specifically to the current public
policy debate on innocent spouse relief, most of the debate being critical of
joint and several liability. One critic concludes that joint and several
liability is "generally inequitable on its face" and others contend that
innocent spouse relief is a "failure" or has become a "guessing game," and in
the midst of this debate the Treasury Department liberalized its interpretation
of one of the three section 6015 tests in January 2012.21 While some of what
19. See Lawrence Solan, Private Language, Public Laws, 93 GEO. L.J. 427
(2007); Daniel Rodriguez & Barry Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionary
Statutory Interpretation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207 (2007); William Buzbee, The
One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2000);
Kenneth Shepsle, Congress is a "They, " Not an It, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239
(1992). For a discussion of congressional intent in the tax area, see Steven Dean &
Lawrence Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code, 26 VA. TAx REV. 879, 903 (2007);
Deborah Grier, Interpreting, supra note 18, at 503-04; Michael Livingston,
Congress, Courts and the Code, 69 TEx. L. REV. 819 (1991).
20. For articles in law reviews since the 1998 change see J. Abraham
Gutting, Note, The "Price" is Right: An Overview ofInnocent Spouse Relief and the
Critical Need for a Uniform Approach to Interpreting Knowledge Requirement of
Internal Revenue Code § 6015, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 751 (2008); M. Megan
Kems, Note, Duress: A Perplexing Barrier to Relief from Joint and Several
Liability, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 1123 (2007) [hereinafter Kerns, Duress]; Richard Beck,
Failure of Innocent Spouse Reform, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 928, 932 (2006)
[hereinafter Beck, Failure]; Adrianne Hodgkins, Comment, Getting a Second
Chance: The Need for Tax Court Jurisdiction Over IRS Denials of Relief under
Section 66, 65 LA. L. REV. 1167 (2005); Lily Kahng, Innocent Spouses: A Critique of
the New Tax Laws Governing Joint and Several Tax Liability, 49 VILL. L. REV. 261
(2004); Svetlana G. Attestatova, Note, The Bonds of Joint Tax Liability Should Not
Be Stronger than Marriage: Congressional Intent Behind § 6015(c) Separation of
Liability Relief 78 WASH. L. REV. 831 (2003) [hereinafter Attestatova, Bonds of
Joint Tax Liability]; Kari Smoker, Comment, IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998: Expanded Relief for Innocent Spouses-at What Cost? A Feminist
Perspective, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 2045 (1999); Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several
Liability and the Joint Return, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 535 (1998) [hereinafter
Christian, Joint and Several Liability]. In addition, one practitioner recently
completed a how-to book for seeking innocent spouse relief. ROBERT B. NADLER, A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR
WINNING SECTION 6015 TAX CASES (2011) [hereinafter NADLER, INNOCENT SPOUSE
RELIEF].
21. Christian, Joint and Several Liability, supra note 20, at 536; Beck,
Failure, supra note 20, at 931; Steve Johnson, SHOULD CONGRESS REFORM THE
1998 REFORM ACT: THE 1998 ACT AND THE RESOURCES LINK BETWEEN TAX
COMPLIANCE AND TAX SIMPLIFICATION, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1058 (2003).
[Vol. 12:8634
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is written reviews a subset of the cases analyzed below, none makes a
systematic evaluation of them. Consequently, the authors' normative
assessments often assume an empirical result.
Part m of this article provides empirical data for those engaged in
this debate and an examination of whether courts are implementing the law
as Congress intended. A content analysis of the 444 cases on innocent spouse
relief decided between July 22, 1998, the effective date of the latest round of
legislative change, and April 15, 2011, requires an examination of these
cases' murky facts and circumstances. This analysis finds that, although
there remains uncertainty as to how a particular case will be decided ex ante,
courts are doing a relatively good job implementing Congress's intent.
However, courts have not developed consistent interpretations of the factors
the Treasury Department uses to define that intent.
Part IV concludes with reasons for these results; it does not make a
normative evaluation of whether this relief is sufficient or whether courts
should implement a statute in accordance with its legislative history. The
normative evaluation will come in the second part of a two-part project. This
first part examines whether the cases handed down since 1998 show that the
regime is accomplishing its legislative purpose, and the second part will
assess whether we should be satisfied with that result or whether we should
prefer one of the proffered alternatives. Thus, this article is an objective
analysis of the law as it operates and judges the success and failure of the
innocent spouse law from Congress's perspective.
PART II. THE LAW IN DEVELOPMENT
The Internal Revenue Code requires anyone liable for federal income
tax to file a federal tax return.22 Married couples are allowed to calculate
their liability by filing jointly.23 If couples choose to file jointly, both
spouses are required to sign the joint return; however, failure to sign the joint
return is not an absolute bar to its validity.24 Spouses' intent is the dispositive
factor.25 Couples may choose to file jointly for many reasons. Joint filing
generally offers favorable tax brackets (compared to filing as married filing
separately), the ability to claim certain tax credits, administrative
convenience, and other real or perceived advantages.
22. I.R.C. § 6011(a).
23. I.R.C. § 6013(a). If spouses do not file jointly, they are required to file
as married persons filing separately. I.R.C. § 1(d).
24. Reg. § 1.6013-1(a)(2).
25. See Malkin v. United States, 3 F.Supp. 2d 493 (D.N.J. 1998); Crew v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. Memo. 1145 (1982); Estate of Campbell v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 1 (1971).
2012] 635
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A separate question from how married couples file their returns is
how does the IRS collect the liability due? Each spouse is currently jointly
and severally liable for the joint return.26 From the collection perspective,
once a joint return is filed, the resulting taxes are not "his" or "her" taxes but
"their" taxes, even if only one spouse earns the income reported on the return
and even if only one spouse participates in the return's preparation.
A. Background
The Treasury Department has consistently supported joint and
several liability, but only congressional action made this result certain. The
Treasury Department explained its original imposition of joint and several
liability in 1923 on the grounds that "a single joint return is one return of a
taxable unit and not two returns of two units on one sheet of paper.' 27
However, in the 1935 case of Cole v. Commissioner,28 the Ninth Circuit
refused to accept the executive branch's conclusion, arguing that the joint
return did not cause spouses to lose their individual identities for tax
purposes.29
The language of Cole left open the possibility that Congress could
impose joint and several liability, and Congress did so in 1938.30 The House
concluded, "It is necessary, for administrative reasons, that any doubt as to
the existence of such liability should be set at rest, if the privilege of filing
such joint returns is continued." 31 After having watched years of litigation,
Congress gave the executive branch a reprieve from future litigation on the
subject.3 2
In the first five decades of the income tax, the only means for
overcoming joint and several liability was for a spouse to prove that he or
she signed the return under duress.3 3 This defense is still available but
26. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3); Reg. § 1.6013-4(b).
27. T.D. 1882, 15 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 203 (1913).
28. Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935).
29. Id.
30. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476
(1938); H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 29-30, 48 (1938); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 75-2330
(1938).
31. H.R. REP.No.75-1860, at 30.
32. Thereafter the Court treated the joint return as creating a single unit
liable for the collective taxes. Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195, 198 (1940);
Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189, 192 (1940).
33. Reg. § 1.6013-4(d). "Duress" in section 6015(c)(3)(C) is interpreted as
abuse and not legal duress, although that is not how Senator Bob Graham, author of
the provision, used the phrase in the Congressional Record. Reg. §1.6015-3(c)(2)(v);
144 CONG. REC. S4473 (1998). With a finding of duress, there is no joint return on
which to impose joint and several liability. See Gormeley v. Commissioner, 98
[Vol. 12:8636
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remains hard to prove because it is a subjective analysis. 34 In addition, courts
have held that the victim spouse must prove not just abuse but that the joint
tax return was signed under duress.3 5 Although duress does not have to be as
extreme as receiving a threat of death immediately prior to signing a return,
there must be a constraint of will so strong that it makes a person reasonably
unable to resist a demand to sign.
In the early 1970s, Congress decided that the duress defense was
insufficient after several cases were decided in which wives were held liable
for taxes on funds their husbands had embezzled. These wives were almost
always divorced. Of the ten cases handed down between 1965 and 1971 in
which the husband was an embezzler, seven of the couples were divorced
and one wife was widowed.36 Although these cases did not win significant
attention in the popular press, their judges repeatedly called for congressional
reform. 37 In fact, the Tax Court once lamented, "Although we have much
sympathy for petitioner's unhappy situation and are appalled at the harshness
of this result in the instant case, the inflexible statute leaves no room for
T.C.M. (CCH) 420, 421, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2009-252 at 1859. Raymond v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 191, 197 (2002). For those successfully claiming duress,
spouses are treated as married filing separately, possibly losing credits and becoming
subject to higher tax brackets, whereas those claiming innocent spouse relief may be
relieved of all liability. M. Meghan Kerns, Duress, supra note 20, at 1144.
34. See In re Hickley, 256 B.R. 814, 825 (2000); Malkin v. United States, 3
F.Supp. 2d 493, 499 (D.N.J. 1998).
35. Hickley, 256 B.R. at 828; Wiksell v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH)
2360, 2368-69, T.C.M. (RIA) T 1994-099 at 94-486 - 87; see also Stanley v.
Commissioner, 45 T.C. 555, 562 (1966) ("Proof that a starving man was ordered at
gunpoint to eat a piece of bread would not, standing alone, be satisfactory proof that
it had been eaten involuntarily.").
36. Wissing v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1428, 1428 (1970); Abrams v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 230, 231 (1969); Huelsman v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 477,
478 (6th Cir. 1969); Sharwell v. Commissioner 419 F.2d 1057, 1058 (6th Cir. 1969);
Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36, 38 (1967); Davenport v. Commissioner, 48
T.C. 921, 922 (1967); Wenker v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1237, 1237,
T.C.M. (P-H) 1 66,240 at 1387; Hackney v. Commissioner 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 655,
655-56, T.C.M. (P-H) 65,127 at 717-18. Of the six cases where the couple
remained married, in four the wife was the embezzler. Hauser v. Commissioner, 29
T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 909, T.C.M. (P-H) 70,207 at 997; Peters v. Commissioner, 51
T.C. 226, 228 (1968); Pridgen v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 131, 131, T.C.M.
(P-H) 1 67,023 at 143; Horn v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 621, 622 (5th Cir. 1967);
Kenny v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 913, 913, T.C.M. (P-H) 66,174 at
1026; Bonner v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 517, 517, T.C.M. (P-H) 66,096
at 580.
37. For the one article in the New York Times, see Elizabeth Fowler, New
Tax Rules Aid Innocent Spouse in Case ofFraud on a Joint Return, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
29, 1971.
2012] 637
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amelioration. It would seem that only remedial legislation can soften the
impact of the rule of strict individual liability."38 When couples remained
married, the Tax Court was less sympathetic.3 9
Not all courts felt impotent to provide at least certain wives relief.
The Sixth Circuit complained, "We are not convinced . .. that the statute is
so inflexible that an innocent wife who has been victimized by a dishonest
husband must be subjected to an additional appallingly harsh penalty by the
United States Government."40 Shortly before Congress acted, the Sixth
Circuit began crafting a balancing test to be used when determining whether
a wife could be granted relief.41
As these cases progressed through the courts, Congress completed a
year of major revisions to the tax code triggered by revelations that 154
wealthy taxpayers had not paid any income tax, and congressional attention
continued to focus on improving tax administration.4 2  Joint and several
liability was one part of that administration. After a round of hearings,
Congress claimed that the rule of joint and several liability resulted in a
"grave injustice" in the administration of the income tax.43 In 1971, Congress
legislated relief, which the Treasury Department did not oppose, and thereby
averted the need for the Sixth Circuit's exercise ofjudicial power.
This congressional relief was intended as a hardship relief provision
for those taxpayers in serious financial difficulty and was never intended to
apply to all joint filers.45 The 1971 provision, enacted as section 6013(e) of
38. Scudder, 48 T.C. at 41.
39. "Accordingly, even though Mary may not have known of or benefited
from the embezzlement activity (a fact which we tend to doubt), we must
nevertheless reject the petitioners' contention that Mary is not liable for the
deficiencies asserted by the respondent." Hauser, 29 T,C.M. (CCH) 909, 914,
T.C.M. (P-H) T 70,207 at 1002.
40. Huelsman, 416 F.2d at 480-81.
41. Sharwell, 419 F.2d at 1061.
42. Comm. Ways and Means and Comm. on Fin., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. Tax
Reform Studies and Proposals U.S. Treasury Department, pt. 1, 89-94 (Comm. Print
1969).
43. S. Rep. No. 91-1537, at 2 (1970); H. Rep. No. 91-1734, at 2 (1970).
44. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063, 2063
(1971); S. Rep. No. 91-1537 (1970). Congress had previously enacted at least one
private tax bill helping individual couples. See Richard Beck, The Innocent Spouse
Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 349-50 (1990) [hereinafter Beck, Innocent Spouse
Problem].
45. See S. Rep. No. 91-1537 at 3; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1734 at 3; STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING
To TAX TREATMENT OF "INNOCENT SPOUSES" (JCX-6-98) (1998) [hereinafter JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND]; GAO,
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 15, at 7.
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the Code, only offered relief in cases involving income omitted from the
return where the spouse seeking relief could prove that he or she met certain
strict requirements.46 Although section 6013(e) was somewhat liberalized in
1984, innocent spouse relief continued to operate as a hardship provision.47
The requesting spouse had to prove that the joint return contained a
"substantial understatement" of tax attributable to "grossly erroneous" items
of the other spouse; in signing the return, the spouse seeking relief did not
know, and had no reason to know, of the understatement; and, under the
circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold the spouse seeking relief liable
for the understatement. The substantial omission requirement meant that for
most taxpayers the omission had to exceed 25 percent of the gross income
shown on the return.48 That the requesting spouse did not know or have
reason to know was "rooted in the common law of restitution" as a means of
ensuring the requesting spouse was "wholly innocent."49 And a floor amount
of tax liability at $500 prevented small claims from gaining relief.50
B. Congressional Action
Concerned about the equity of joint and several liability for joint
return filers, in 1995, the American Bar Association (ABA) resolved that it
be repealed. Congress responded to the ABA by directing the General
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Treasury Department to study section
6013(e) and to evaluate the ABA's proposal. The inquiry was no longer
whether innocent spouse relief worked as hardship relief but whether it
46. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (repealed).
47. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424, 98 Stat. 494,
801. For a description of the 1984 changes, see Lisa Edison-Smith, "If You Love Me,
You'll Sign My Tax Returns" Spousal Joint and Several Liability for Federal Income
Taxes and the "Innocent Spouse" Exception, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 102 (1994).
48. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(A) (repealed).
49. Report on Joint Liability, supra note 13, at 16; S. REP. NO. 91-1537, at
6089.
50. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (repealed).
51. ABA, Proceedings of the 1995 Midyear Meeting of the House of the
Delegates, 120 No. 1 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 5-6 (1995); Section Resolutions, 13 A.B.A.
SEC. TAX'N NEWSL. 13 (1994). See also Domestic Relations Comm., Am. Bar
Assoc. Section on Tax'n, Comments on Liability of Divorced Spouses for Tax
Deficiencies on Previously Filed Joint Returns, 50 TAX LAW. 395 (1997). On the
other hand, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants proposed a
uniform 10% threshold of gross income for all requests. AICPA Proposes Legislative
Changes on Tax Treatment ofMarriage and Divorce, 67 TAX NoTES 87 (1995).
52. Taxpayer Bill of Rights II, Pub. L. No. 104-168, §401, 110 Stat. 1452,
1459 (1996).
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provided "meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is appropriate."
These departments both concluded that, although existing relief was not
perfect, it was best not to limit a spouse's liability to his or her "share" of the
couple's taxes.54
With this information, the House Subcommittee on Oversight held a
day of hearings on innocent spouse relief.55 These hearings were part of
broader hearings focused on a complete restructuring of the IRS with the aim
of curbing perceived overzealousness in revenue collection. The Republican
Congress sought to require the IRS to give renewed attention to taxpayers as
"customers," which meant expanding many pro Vams, late in the process
extended to include greater innocent spouse relief. By the time the final bill
was before Congress, it was thought to give "David the taxpayer an arsenal
of powerful slingshots to use against Goliath the IRS."S7
The four witnesses on innocent spouse relief at the Senate Finance
Committee Hearings were divorced women. These women told stories
certain to elicit sympathy for the wives and anger at the tax system: tales of
ex-husbands who not only stuck their ex-wives with extraordinary tax
burdens but also shirked their responsibility for child support and of an IRS
that told one wife that there was no reason to go after her former husband for
53. H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, sec. 401 (emphasis added).
54. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-34, INFORMATION ON
THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY STANDARD (1997). Although its
recommendations were limited, the GAO noted that the IRS did not receive many
requests and "denied most of them." Id. at 4. The Treasury Department worried that
proposals for proportionate liability "would impose increased burdens on taxpayers
and the IRS yet would still require some kind of equitable relief provisions in certain
egregious situations." Report on Joint Liability, supra note 13, at 2. The Treasury
Department made no estimation of the cost of repeal although it noted such problems
as a lack of computing capacity and the need to hire seasonal workers. Id. at 3, 27-
29.
55. Treasury Department Report on Innocent Spouse Relief: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th
Cong. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Oversight Subcommittee].
56. H. R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 252-55 (1998). See also 144 CONG.
REC. S1780 (1998); 143 CONG. REC. H10027, H10032 (1997).
57. 144 Cong. Rec. H5353 (1998) (statement of Representative William
Archer).
58. Senate Committee on Finance, Unofficial Transcript of Finance
Hearing on Innocent Spouse Tax Rules, 78 TAX NoTEs 1009 (1998) [hereinafter
Finance Committee]. There remains a sense that Congress acted because divorced or
separated women were frequently targeted for former husbands' taxes. Michael
Schlesinger, Obtaining Innocent Spouse Relief in the Face of the Service's
Propensity to Litigate, 109 J. TAX'N 102, 105 (2008).
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taxes owed because it could collect from her.59 For those proposing changes
to innocent spouse relief, the concern was that taxpayers who should be
receiving relief were unsuccessful in obtaining relief under section 6013(e).
Senator Bob Graham complained that section 6013(e) was "theoretical"
relief because it was "virtually impossible for the standards of that innocent
spouse provision to be met." 60 Senator William Roth declared that "the
agency is all too often electing to go after those who would be considered
innocent spouses because they are easier to locate, as well as less inclined
and able to fight."6 1
Thus, in their effort to reform the IRS, some within Congress saw
revision of innocent spouse relief as an opportunity to limit the IRS's ability
to collect taxes from some wives. "Nine out of 10 innocent spouses are
women. Maybe that is because they are more likely to pay up when
confronted by the IRS. Maybe it is because women sometimes have fewer
resources to defend themselves. In either case, singling out women for
abusive collection is just plain wrong." 63 In response to the "horror stories"
the Senate had heard, one Senator focused his comments only on divorced or
separated wives. Others expanded their consideration to the widowed or to
wives whose husbands had embezzled from them.65 The one reference to
husbands as victims in the Congressional Record was meant to surprise the
listeners that this could be a problem for husbands as well. 66
For those advocating for a new innocent spouse provision, there was
a recognition that liberalized relief would be "fairly expensive ... in terms of
the potential for lost revenue."67 Nevertheless, there was no discussion on
59. Finance Committee, supra note 58.
60. 144 CONG. REc. S4473-74 (1998) (statement of Senator Bob Graham).
61. Finance Committee, supra note 58. See also 144 CONG. REC. S4028,
S4033 (1998).
62. All but one mention of innocent spouse relief in the Congressional
Record referred to wives, most often divorced wives. See also 144 CONG. REC.
S7647 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. S1072-73 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. S1071 (1998);
144 CONG. REC. S4493 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. S4027 (1998); 144 CONG. REC.
S4475 (1998); 144 Cong. Rec. H5354.
63. 144 CONG. REc. S725 (1998) (statement of Senator Jon Kyl).
64. 144 CONG. REc. S7653 (1998) (statement of Senator Jack Murkowski).
See also 144 CONG. REC. S7642 (1998).
65. 144 CONG. REC. S7628 (1998) (statement of Senator Judd Gregg);
S7634 (statement of Senator Harry Reid).
66. But see 144 Cong. Rec. S4504 (1998) (statement of Senator Olympia
Snowe).
67. 144 CONG. REC. S4474 (1998) (statement of Senator Bob Graham).
Despite the sense of Congress, there is a general sense in discussions of innocent
spouse relief that "the consequences to the fisc are not cause for alarm. . . ." Jonathan
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the floor of the actual cost of this relief. There was also no discussion of
cases that might appear less sympathetic on their face - Congress kept
referring to wives who were deceived before being left crushing tax burdens,
often while caring for the couples' children.68 In the rush to expand taxpayer
protections from the IRS, Congress swept through this change to tax practice
without fully vetting the cost or the reach of the new provision.
That does not mean that proponents were unaware of, or
unconcerned about, potential abuse of innocent spouse relief.
There were concerns, and rightly so, that some taxpayers
may try to abuse the innocent spouse rules by knowingly
signing false returns, or transferring assets for the purpose of
avoiding the payment of tax, and then claim to be innocent.
Obvious V9, no one would want to open the door to that type
of fraud.
For all of the cases where there might be abuse of this new provision,
proponents of liberalization were quick to claim that "relief will not be
available in cases of fraud, or if the IRS proves the taxpayer claiming
innocent spouse relief had actual knowledge of an item giving rise to the tax
liability."
On the heels of this debate and as part of its comprehensive reform
of the IRS, Congress repealed section 6013(e) and enacted new section 6015,
but the result was not what either house had initially proposed. The House
of Representatives would have removed the hardship nature of the earlier
relief but not otherwise changed the law.72 The Senate, on the other hand,
would have allowed all spouses (married and divorced) to apportion liability
between them.7 3 With a relatively free rein because the administration was
T. Trexler, Contesting Innocent Spouse Relief The Intervention Pardox, 126 TAX
NOTES 499, 499 (2010) [hereinafter Trexler, Contesting].
68. See supra notes 59-67.
69. 144 CONG. REc. S4474 (1998) (statement of Senator Alphonse
D'Amato).
70. 144 CONG. REc. S7623 (1998) (statement of Senator William Roth).
71. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (1998).
72. H. R. REP. No. 105-364, at 19-20 (1997); JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, PRESENTLA WAND BACKGROUND, supra note 45.
73. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 56-57 (1998). It was important to one of the
Senate bill's authors that the bill "would not change the tax tables to eliminate the
reduced taxes that many times accompany joint filing;" couples were to enjoy the
best of marriage bonuses (for those entitled to them) and separate liability. 144
CONG. REC. S1073 (1998) (statement of Senator Bob Graham). The Senate's
liberalization, assuming no interaction with any other proposal, was estimated to cost
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cowed, the last thing the Conference Committee considered was innocent
spouse relief and, with the House and Senate versions before it, the
Committee reached a compromise providing three distinct means of relief.74
In the Conference Committee's first new provision, as the House had
proposed, the 1971 innocent spouse relief was liberalized into current section
6015(b). Pursuant to section 6015(b), a requesting spouse only has to
demonstrate that a tax liability is owed because of an understatement
attributable to the other spouse's erroneous item; that the requesting spouse
did not know, or have reason to know, of the existence of that erroneous
item; and that, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it would
be inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for the taxes due. 75
The Conference Committee also incorporated from the Senate's
version of the bill section 6015(c), which apportioned liability for divorced
or legally separated s ouses or those spouses who have lived apart for the
prior twelve months. Pursuant to section 6015(c), a requesting spouse's
liability can be limited to his or her share of the couple's liability. Unlike
with section 6015(b), inequity is not a factor under section 6015(c). Instead,
section 6015(c) eliminates the presumption of unity for spouses who no
longer function as a marital unit.7 7 The presumption is in favor of this
allocation unless the IRS can prove that the requesting spouse had actual
knowledge of the tax liability.7 8
In addition to these two forms of broadened but still limited relief,
the Conference Committee added a third form of equitable relief to be
granted at the IRS's discretion.79 Section 6015(f) grants the IRS tremendous
$5.157 billion between 1997 and 2007. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
COMPARISON OF THE ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF H.R. 2676 (JCX-44-98)
(1998).
74. Unofficial Transcript of Tax Analysts Program on IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act, 2008 TNT 146-50; H. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 251-55.
75. I.R.C. § 6015(b). A spouse can get proportional relief under section
6015(b) if he or she can demonstrate lack of knowledge of the extent of the
understatement. I.R.C. § 6015(b)(2).
76. I.R.C. § 6015(c). A widow is treated as though no longer married. H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 252 n16.
77. Bryan Camp, The Unhappy Marriage ofLaw and Equity in Joint Return
Liability, 108 TAX NOTES 1307, 1314 (2005).
78. I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C). Congress had asked the GAO and Treasury
Department for an evaluation of binding the IRS to negotiated settlements between
divorcing and separating spouses; Congress was not willing to go so far in the final
legislation. H. R. REP. No. 104-506, at 7-8 (1996); sec. 401; Oversight
Subcommittee, supra note 55.
79. H. R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-599 at 254.
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latitude in providing relief if the prior two provisions are inapplicable.so This
provision allows that "the Secretary may relieve such individual of such
liability" if, "taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold the individual liable." 81 Section 6015(f) is also the only
means to relief for spouses where there is the underpayment of tax on a
correct return, as opposed to an understatement of tax on the return.82
This final tripartite relief provision was cobbled together, crafted
during a period of tremendous legislative change affecting the business
operations of the IRS, and the statutory language lays out no singular vision
of when and why particular spouses should be granted relief. There was,
however, nothing in the final reports to indicate that there had been a change
from the earlier statements made in Congress. Even with the very different
approaches proposed by each house, the provision's goal was to grant relief
from liability to divorced or separated wives who were left crushing tax
burdens by their nefarious husbands.
The 1998 Act required the Treasury Department to quickly draft
rules implementing the new provision, as the law was effective upon
enactment. 83 These rules and regulations then guided the IRS in its
determination of whether relief should be granted to particular claims.
The Treasury Regulation interpreting the equitable prongs of section
6015(b) and (f) are currently based on factors provided in Revenue
Procedure 2003-61, although the IRS has recently proposed changes to the
Revenue Procedure for section 6015(f), but under both provisions the IRS
considers whether the requesting spouse received a significant benefit,
directly or indirectly, beyond normal support from the unpaid taxes; was
abused; or will suffer economic hardship if relief is not granted.84 In this
80. I.R.C. § 6015(f). In 2006, the Tax Court was given jurisdiction to
review stand-alone equitable relief determinations. Tax Relief and Health Care Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. C, §408, 120 Stat. 2922, 3061 (2006).
81. I.R.C. § 6015(f).
82. The conference committee would not extend section 6015(c) to reported
but unpaid tax but, instead, left that for equitable relief. H. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599
at 254-55 (1998). The IRS treats elections under section 6015(b) and (c) as an
application under section 6015(f); however, an application of section 6015(f) relief
does not automatically trigger an application of section 6015(b) and (c). Reg.
§1.6015-1(a)(2).
83. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-589T, INFORMATION ON
SELECTED IRS TAx ENFORCEMENT AND COLLECTION EFFORTS 17 (2001)
[hereinafter GAO, INFORMATION].
84. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, superseding Rev. Proc. 2000-15,
2000-1 C.B. 447; Notice 2012-8, supra note 9. The Treasury Department's
guidelines for section 6015(f) are more extensive than for section 6015(b) and
include certain threshold conditions plus additional levels of factors before the
Commissioner will grant a request for equitable relief. Id., at 298.
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weighing of factors as directed by Revenue Procedure 2003-61, no single
factor is determinative, and the IRS must weigh all of the factors together.8 5
Nevertheless, under this rule while reason to know of the tax deficiency "will
not be weighed more heavily than other factors," actual knowledge of it is "a
strong factor weighing against relief.86 Some courts use these factors as a
mathematical equation, adding up those factors that weigh for and those
against relief to determine whether relief should be granted.
Throughout this attempt by the Treasury Department to clarify the
statute is an attempt to create rules applying section 6015 to spouses for
whom Congress intended relief. The next Part will assess to what extent
courts feel the Treasury Department's rules accomplish that objective. In
addition, the next Part will evaluate to what extent courts apply
congressional intent - the desire to provide relief to divorced, deserted, or
widowed wives unfairly left with an overwhelming tax liability created by
their former husbands.
PART M. THE LAW IN PLAY
As the IRS adapted to its new focus on customer service - in the
middle of an economic downturn - the IRS received 1,200 applications for
innocent spouse relief per week in mid-2000.89 More than 46,000 taxpayers
had already made 79,000 applications for relief.90 As the IRS dealt with this
onslaught of relief requests, it worked to give substance and meaning to the
new provision. From its legislative history, section 6015 was created with the
intention of providing relief to "innocent spouses"; however, determining
who was "innocent" proved costly to administer.9 1 The Cincinnati Service
85. Id., at 298.
86. Id. Although the Revenue Procedure authorizes consideration of other
factors, little evidence of weighing additional factors is apparent from the cases.
Pursuant to Notice 2012-8, actual knowledge will no longer be weighed more
heavily than other factors. Notice 2012-8, § 4.03(2)(c)(i), supra note 9.
87. See, e.g., Greer v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1075, 1079, T.C.M.
(RIA) 12009-020 at 112-13. Motsko v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.M. 711, 714-15,
T.C.M. (RIA T 2006-017 at 104. Pursuant to Notice 2012-8, no one factor or
majority of factors necessarily controls the determination for equitable relief. Notice
2012-8, § 4.03(2), supra note 9.
88. More recent developments in the Treasury Department's interpretation
of this provision are discussed infra.
89. Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax
Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 1013, 1044 (2003)
[hereinafter Johnson, The 1998 Act].
90. Id.
91. Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of Titles I-VIII
of the Conference Agreement Relating to H.R. 2676, 79 TAx NoTEs 1741 (1998).
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Center Integrated Case Processing System (ICP) began operations as the
nation's primary reviewer of relief requests in January 2001. Of the 48,461
claims for relief sought in 2005, 42.5 percent were denied without reaching
the merits and an additional 29.0 percent were disallowed in full. 93
Reviewing these denials, the National Taxpayer Advocate found that
29 percent of the IRS's rejections were because the liability had already been
paid and another 6 percent were rejected because the requesting spouse
confused innocent spouse relief and injured spouse relief.94 In 26 percent of
cases, a joint return had not been filed or a joint return had been filed but the
couple was not married or did not sign the return, and in 19 percent, no
return had been filed.95 Many of these errors were the result of taxpayers
filing for incorrect years and they likely refiled for the correct years. The
Treasury Inspector General of Tax Administration found that the IRS
properly resolved 94 percent of the cases it reviewed in 2004. 9
If ICP denies relief, requesting spouses may appeal to the Appeals
Office.98 In fiscal year 2010, Appeals heard 5,341 section 6015 claims (less
92. GAO, INFORMATION, supra note 83, at 18.
93. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, at 329
(2006) [hereinafter NTA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT]. This is down from the 48.7%
defective on their face in 1999-2001. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-
558, IRS INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVED; BALANCED
PERFORMANCE MEASURES NEEDED 34 (2002) [hereinafter GAO, INNOCENT SPOUSE
PROGRAM].
94. NTA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 331. Taxes already paid
was up from 19.4% in 1999-2001 but confusion with injured spouse relief was down
from 6.6%. GAO, IRS's INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVED,
supra note 93, at 34.
95. NTA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 331. That the couple did
not file a joint return or filed it incorrectly was down from 30.6% in 1999-2001.
GAO, INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM, supra note 93, at 34.
96. Not noting the incorrect filings double-counts these taxpayer errors as
valid claims. If the problem is an incorrect year, the IRS sends the requesting spouse
a letter indicating the years that have joint liabilities and inviting appropriate
applications for relief. NTA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 332 n.32.
97. TIGTA, The Innocent Spouse Review Function, May 2005, Ref. 2005-
40-075, at 5-6. TREAs. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., Ref. No. 2005-40-075,
THE INNOCENT SPOUSE CENTRALIZED REvIEw FUNCTION ENSURED ACCURATE
RELIEF DETERMINATIONS, BUT IMPROVEMENTS COULD INCREASE CUSTOMER
SERVICE 5-6 (2005) [hereinafter TIGTA, ACCURATE RELIEF DETERMINATIONS].
98. In 2005, each case took on average 192 days to process, 807 days if the
application went to Appeals. NTA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 423.
While centralized processing is more efficient, there is concern that its efficiencies
cause some cases to be denied the relief Congress intended. Scott Schumacher,
Innocent Spouse, Administrative Process: Time for Reforms, 130 TAX NOTES 113
(2011) [hereinafter Schumacher, Administrative Process].
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than 4 percent of all appeals) and 4,610 were closed that year.99 In the
Appeals process, additional relief was granted in 35 percent of the claims in
2005.100 In a survey conducted by the ABA Section of Taxation, 73.1
percent of those surveyed believed that the Appeals Office is "generally fair"
and, for those handling innocent spouse cases in the two years before the
survey, only 17 percent thought the Appeals Office did not exercise
independence from the auditors initially denying relief.101 While one
commenter found that the Appeals Office "rubberstamp[s] whatever the
Service has done," 62.7 percent were satisfied with the way the Appeals
Office handled their innocent spouse cases.102
While 71.5 percent of claims were denied relief, only 2.7 percent of
those not deemed ineligible on their face were litigated in the Tax Court.10 3
Nevertheless, there are complaints that too many cases are not resolved by
the administrative process and find their way into the judicial system.10
Although that is a normative assessment not being evaluated in this article,
innocent spouse relief was listed as one of the top ten litigated issues in the
Taxpayer Advocate's 2010 Annual Report and for every year since 2001
except for 2003. os Any requesting spouse may seek relief from the Tax
Court as long as a petition is filed no later than ninety days after the IRS
mails its final determination notice to the requesting spouse or if the IRS fails
to issue a ruling within six months. 106
This article examines the 444 litigated cases involving claims for
innocent spouse relief that have been decided since the 1998 legislative
enactment. It evaluates the standards courts apply against the legislative
history. In addition, the article explores which particular factors are most
likely to weigh for or against relief.
A. Mechanics of the Study
This sample includes all recorded federal tax decisions in the LEXIS
database handed down between July 22, 1998, and April 15, 2011, that
include the words "innocent spouse," "tax," and "6015." Each case was
coded for a variety of information and compiled into a spreadsheet, including
99. IRS Data Book 2010, table 21.
100. NTA, 2005 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 330.
101. ABA, Section of Taxation, Survey Report on Independence of IRS
Appeals, August 11, 2007, 1-2.
102. Id. at 12.
103. NTA, 2005 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 329-330 n.23.
104. Schumacher, Administrative Process, supra note 98. Schumacher also
complains that denials are often made without explanation. Id.
105. NTA, 2010 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 414.
106. I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1).
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information about the parties (education, employment history, role in family
finances, etc.), the liability (source, amount, etc. , and the parties' relation to
the liability (knowledge of, benefit from, etc.).'o When cases were appealed,
information from earlier or later appeals were used to supplement the
spreadsheet. In this content analysis, it is not the goal to rank the importance
of variables but to look for patterns within the cases that might otherwise be
missed while retaining the language and tone of these varied cases.los
This article is concerned with the results of these opinions and not
how judges reached their conclusions or what interpretive technique they
adopted. The author acknowledges that there is a limit to the information that
can be gleaned from this methodology. First, not all cases that were filed
resulted in written opinions. Some were settled and others resulted in
unwritten bench opinions.109 Therefore, the opinions used in this sample are
not all cases filed or decided in the courts. Second, judicial opinions are
available only for those claims for which the taxpayer had the resources and
inclination to pursue relief in court. Thus, there is a selection bias in the
cases. The litigated cases should be among those claims with the less
favorable factors for relief as those with more favorable factors would
presumably have been granted relief during administrative review.110 Despite
these limitations, this analysis should provide valuable information regarding
the implementation of innocent spouse relief. Moreover, this review furthers
analysis of the extent to which courts defer to executive agencies and the
extent to which they implement congressional intent.
1. Choice of Courts
The courts included in this sample are all of the federal courts that
review federal tax cases. Federal tax cases are held for trial before the Tax
Court, District Courts, and the Court of Federal Claims.111 Decisions of the
107. In the charts below, unless a particular case is referenced, case names
are not provided to control for footnote length. This information, as well as the
spreadsheet, is available from the author.
108. As a result, this Article does not purport to provide predictive
indicators of how a particular case might be resolved. Moreover, the small sample
size for many of the issues considered prevent arguing their statistical significance.
For a discussion of content analysis, see Mark Hall & Ronald Wright, Systematic
Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REv. 63 (2008). Although a
regression analysis might find additional hidden patterns or associations between
factors, because of the sample size and the desire to retain the stories of the
requesting spouses themselves, that work is left for a future project.
109. Bommarito, Empirical Survey, supra note 17, at 530.
110. Ideally, this assumption will be tested by a later study at ICP.
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 7422; Flora v. U.S., 357 U.S.
63 (1958).
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Tax Court and District Courts are appealed to the appropriate Circuit Court
of Appeals; decisions of the Court of Federal Claims are appealed to the
Federal Circuit.112 No innocent spouse case has yet been decided by the
Supreme Court. Because courts often considered different factors and issues
when a case was on appeal, the 9.5 percent of cases heard on appeal are
counted separately from the underlying trial opinion. The final tally of
innocent spouse cases was 444.113
The Tax Court issues three different types of decisions: regular,
memorandum, and summary. In addition to regular opinions, the Tax Court's
memorandum decisions are not officially published and present nothing more
than factual issues. 114 Summary opinions are issued when the amount in
dispute is $50,000 or less and the taxpayer elects to have the case conducted
under a "small tax case" proceeding using simplified rules of evidence,
practice, and procedure and waives the right to appeal.115 All Tax Court
opinions are included in this sample because they disclose how facts and
reasoning interact in the decision-making process.
The Tax Court is the only court in which a taxpayer does not have to
first pay the liability and then sue for a refund, and about 90 percent of all tax
cases are heard in the Tax Court. Before 1998, 90 percent of innocent
spouse cases were initially heard in the Tax Court; since 1998, 91.8 percent
(or slightly more than for all tax cases) have been initiated there. 117
112. I.R.C. § 7482; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1294, 1295.
113. There are 492 cases as a result of the search; forty-eight cases are not
relevant to this study. Bankruptcy and state court decisions are excluded from the
sample.
114. James Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls, 66
TENN. L. REv. 351, 368 (1999) [hereinafter Maule, Instant Replay].
115. I.R.C. § 7463.
116. IRS Data Book 2010, table 27. There are three jurisdictional bases
upon which the Tax Court may review a claim for innocent spouse relief First,
section 6015(e) provides that a spouse who has requested relief can petition the
IRS's denial of relief or petition the IRS's failure to make a timely determination.
Such cases are referred to as "stand alone" cases in that they are independent of any
deficiency proceeding. Stand-alone basis was extended to section 6015(f) in 2006.
See supra note 81. Second, the Tax Court may exercise jurisdiction when a claim is
raised as an affirmative defense in a petition for redetermination of a deficiency filed
pursuant to section 6213(a). Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 287-88 (2000).
Finally, the Tax Court may exercise jurisdiction when the issue is properly raised in
a collection proceeding under sections 6320 and 6330. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(i).
117. Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses, Reasonable Women and Divorce:
The Gap Between and the Internal Revenue Code, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421,
424-5 (1996) [hereinafter Zorn, Innocent Spouses].
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CHOICE OF COURTS
Tax Court of District Circuit
Court Claims Court Court
Number of
cases 369 2 31 42
Percentage of
cases 83.1% 0.5% 7.0% 9.5%
Number of
wins"' 136 1 9 8
Winning
percentage 36.9% 50.0% 29.0% 19.0%
Not only are most cases initiated in the Tax Court, but 88.3 percent of the
total taxpayer wins were in the Tax Court and taxpayers' Tax Court winning
percentage, if you discount the two cases heard in the Court of Claims, is the
highest. This is despite the fact that taxpayers do not have to prepay their
liabilities in the Tax Court and so weaker cases would presumably be
brought there because of the lower cost. Based on the 2010 data for the ten
most litigated issues, taxpayers' overall success rate of 20.6 percent was
significantly lower than the 34.7 percent rate in this sample for innocent
spouse relief.119
Unlike those studies finding the Tax Court biased in favor of the
government, the Tax Court is not dismissive of innocent spouse claims. 120In
fact, in United States v. Boscaljon,121 the court ordered that an innocent
spouse claim be raised for a 74-year-old wife even though she had not
requested such relief.122 However, throwing oneself, or one's client, on the
mercy of the Tax Court does not often work. In Gormeley v.
118. Counted as wins for the requesting spouse and not for an intervenor.
119. NTA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 417. Because of the
IRS's recent change in position on the statute of limitations for section 6015(f), six
cases will result in taxpayer victories. Notice 2011-70, 2011-32 I.R.B. 135. These
cases are not counted as winning cases in this sample because the change was
beyond the period of review.
120. For the debate regarding the Tax Court's bias, see Maule, Instant
Replay, supra note 114; Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the
Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied
Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 998-1000 (1991). One study
concludes that Tax Court trial judges, but not appellate judges, do exhibit a bias. B.
Anthony Billings et al. Are U.S. Tax Court Decisions Subject to the Bias of the
Judge? 55 TAX NOTES 1259, 1266 (1992) [hereinafter Billings, Decisions].
121. 105 A.F.T.R. 2d 1501 (2010).
122. Id. It is unlikely Ms. Boscaljon was granted relief because her house
was ultimately foreclosed upon. See 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46354.
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Commissioner,123 the court quoted the requesting spouse's counsel as stating,
"So, what I'm trying to ask the Court here to do is try to help my client out
here by finding a way to rule because this is an equitable thing that Congress
really wanted to help taxpayers get some ruling from the Court under
6015(e)."l2 The court would not overlook that the client had not filed a
petition within the 90-day window and, therefore, the court did not have
jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the case.125
The Tax Court, where the majority of innocent spouse cases are
heard, is composed of nineteen judges (sixteen judges are currently sitting)
who have each been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate
for fifteen-year terms. Unless the Tax Court sits en banc, decisions by
individual judges who hear cases are reviewed by the chief judge and,
possibly, the full Tax Court.126 In addition to regular judges, special trial
judges may be appointed by the chief judge from time to time. The following
chart only includes judges who have ruled on at least five innocent spouse
cases.
123. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 420, T.C.M. (RIA) 12009-252.
124. Id., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 420, 421, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-252 at 1859.
125. Id., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 420, 421-22, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2009-252 at
1860. See also Carlton Smith, How Can One Argue 'It's Not my Joint Return' in
Tax Court?, 124 TAx NOTEs 1266 (2009). The case was appealed to the Third
Circuit but, before appeal, the IRS abated assessment because of an improperly filed
notice of determination. Email with Carl Smith, Cardozo Tax Clinic, June 5, 2011.
126. Billings, Decisions, supra note 120, at 1266.
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TAX COURT JUDGES HEARING INNOCENT SPOUSE CASES
Chiechi Cohen Colvin Dawson Foley Gerber Goeke
Appoint- Bush Reagan Reagan Kennedy Clinton Reagan W. Bush
ing
president
Sex Female Female Male Male Male Male Male
No. of
Cases 14 23 10 9 9 10 19
Taxpayer
won 2 4 6 6 3 3 10
Winning
percent-
age 14.3% 17.4% 60.0% 66.7% 33.3% 30.0% 52.6%
Haines Halpern Holmes Jacobs Kroupa Laro Marvel
Appoint- W. Bush W. Bush Reagan W. Bush Bush Clinton
ing Bush
president
Sex Male Male Male Male Female Male Female
No. of
Cases 14 6 12 5 8 8 15
Taxpayer
won 7 3 5 3 2 1 7
Winning
percent-
age 50.0% 50.0% 41.7% 60.0% 25.0% 12.5% 46.7%
Nims Ruwe Swift Thornton Vasquez Wells Wherry
Appoint- Carter Reagan Reagan Clinton Clinton Reagan W. Bush
ing
president
Sex Male Male Male Male Male Male Male
No. of
Cases 7 16 9 10 20 10 10
Taxpayer
won 2 9 5 2 6 0 1
Winning
percent-
age 28.6% 56.3% 55.6% 20.0% 30.0% 0.0% 10.00/0
Armen Carluzzo Couvillion Dean Goldberg Panuthos
Appoint- Special Special Special Special
ing trial Special Special trial trial trial judge trial
president judge trial judge judge judge judge
Sex Male Male Male Male Male Male
No. of
Cases 12 11 17 23 17 16
Taxpayer
won 6 4 5 8 6 6
Winning
percent-
age 50.0% 36.4% 29.4% 34.8% 35.3% 37.5%
[Vol. 12:8652
HeinOnline  -- 12 Fla. Tax Rev. 652 2012
Empirical Study of Innocent Spouse Relief
From this sample of cases, there is a wide range of success rates before these
judges, ranging from 0 percent to 66.7 percent. The political party of the
appointing president does not appear to influence the likelihood of a judge's
decisions. The number of female judges is small but it too does not appear to
be an indicator, although female judges appointed by Republican presidents
have a lower-than-average taxpayer success rate of 17.8 percent. Although
taxpayers are more likely to win before Special Trial Judges, at a 37.5
percent rate, the number is not significantly higher than the winning
percentage before regular judges, 35.7 percent. Of course, to the extent past
decisions are an indicator of future holdings, there are some judges that a
taxpayer would rather come before than others.
There was a dissent in only eleven cases heard by the full court, or
2.5 percent, despite the lack of agreement as to the meaning of various
equitable factors discussed below. All but two of these cases involved
primarily procedural issues, namely the scope of judicial review of IRS
determinations and whether the regulatorily-imposed two-year limit for
appeals under section 6015(f) was permissible. The latter issue has received
much attention.127 Although the statutory language of section 6015(b) and
(c) expressly imposes a two-year window for taxpayers to apply for relief,
until July 2011 the Treasury Department imposed the same limit for claims
for relief under section 6015(f). 28 The validity of this regulatory limit was
repeatedly contested in the courts. In Lantz v. Commissioner,129 a divided
Tax Court held the regulation was invalid, a holding that was followed in
Manella v. Commissioner,130 but their decisions were overturned by the
127. NTA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17; Bryan T. Camp,
Interpreting Statutory Silence, 128 TAx NOTES 501 (2010); Patrick J. Smith, Gaps in
the Seventh Circuit's Reasoning in Lantz, 128 TAX NOTES 1375 (2010); Robert B.
Nadler, Equitable Relief- Time to Level the Playing Field, 133 TAx NOTES 899, 902-
03 (2006); William Brown, Recent Cases Expand Potential for Obtaining Innocent
Spouse Relief 83 PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES 86, 90 (2009).
128. Notice 2011-70, supra note 119; Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1); T.D. 9003,
2002-32 I.R.B. 294. This was despite a letter from Commissioner Shulman to Jim
McDermott, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 20, 2011), 2011 TNT 86-34.
Moreover, the Treasury Department's Chief Counsel instructed the IRS attorneys not
to seek summary judgment for violating the two-year limit but to continue to argue
that relief is unavailable. OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, C.C.N. CC-2009-012,
DESIGNATION FOR LITIGATION: VALIDITY OF TWO-YEAR DEADLINE FOR SECTION
6015(F) CLAIMS UNDER TREAS. REG. § 1.6015-5(B)(1) (2009); OFFICE OF CHIEF
COUNSEL, C.C.N. 2010-11, VALIDITY OF THE TWO-YEAR DEADLINE FOR SECTION
6015(F) CLAIMS UNDER TREAS. REG. § 1.6015-5(B)(1) AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
REVERSAL OF LANTZ (2010).
129. 132 T.C. 131 (2009), rev'd., 607 F.3d. 479 (7th Cir. 2010).
130. 132 T.C. 196 (2009), rev'd., 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011).
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Seventh and Third Circuits. Before the IRS removed this limitation, the
same issue was pending in four other circuits. 132
Not all judges agree as to how various factors for relief should be
interpreted, despite most cases not having dissents. 133 Nevertheless, because
this study tests whether courts implement congressional intent, these judicial
decisions are measured against the legislative history. Each decision is taken
at face value because the concern is the results of cases rather than the
motivations ofjudges.134 In judging the results, the facts and reasoning given
in opinions are assumed to be accurate, understanding that they may not be.
2. Breakdown ofProvisions
Although congressional intent can be identified in committee reports
and the Congressional Record, it is not an operational blueprint. As a result,
the IRS and courts disagree as to its application to particular facts.
Overruling the IRS, courts granted taxpayers relief, at least in part, in 34.7
percent of the litigated cases. Of the 154 cases in which the taxpayer
prevailed, the government did not oppose relief in thirty-six;135 the taxpayer
won only in part in twenty-six; and in forty-nine the taxpayer won procedural
claims (such as in opposition for summary judgment or for remand). In
ninety-one cases, which are 20.5 percent of the total number of section 6015
cases, the requesting spouse won complete relief.136
131. Jones v. Commissioner, 642 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2011), also found the
regulation valid. Camp, supra note 127, argues that the different purposes of (b), (c),
and (f) relief justify Tax Court's decision in Lantz. Smith, Gaps in the Seventh
Circuit Reasoning in Lantz, supra note 127, questions the rationale of the Seventh
Circuit.
132. See NTA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 502.
133. See, e.g., supra Part III.C.I.c. and III.C.2.a.
134. This approach is similar to Bradley W. Joondeph, Exploring the "Myth
of Parity" in State Taxation: State Court Decisions Interpreting Public Law, Wash.
U. J.L. & POL'Y, 205 (2003). For a discussion of how to judge judicial motivation,
see Tonja Jacobi and Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically
Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEo. L.J. 1, 8 (2009); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding
Complexity, Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 477 (2009); Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme
Court Justices: Who, When and How Important, 101 Nw. U.L. REV. 1483 (2007);
Daniel Scheider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory
Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325 (2001).
135. Litigation continues because the non-requesting spouse as intervenor
opposes relief for the requesting spouse. See supra Part II.D.3.
136. The categories of winning cases do not equal the total wins because
some cases fit in multiple categories. For example, those in which judges did not
oppose relief may also count as complete relief.
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The means to obtaining relief are through one of three avenues
provided in section 6015. Each avenue applies to different, and limited,
circumstances. Which of the three provisions offers the best chance of
success depends in large part on the facts of the case. As described in the
prior Part, sections 6015(b) and (c) offer more automated processes because
the statutory and regulatory factors to be considered are significantly fewer
than imposed on the broad equitable relief of section 6015(f). This was
intentional. The Conference Report for the 1998 Act noted that relief under
section 6015(f) was to be an equitable last resort. 137
Under section 6015(b), the burden of proof is on the requesting
spouse; the taxpayer must prove his or her claim by the preponderance of the
evidence.138 Two key characteristics of section 6015(b) cases are that these
cases involve only the understatement of taxes owed on a joint return and
they require a balancing of factors under its equitable prong. In the eleven
successful cases decided on the merits solely under section 6015(b), the court
found in each that the requesting spouse had no knowledge of the deficiency.
In eight of the nine in which the court mentioned substantial benefit, the
court found there was none; and in the four cases in which the court
mentioned economic hardship, the court found that it would result for the
requesting spouse. It is difficult to decipher other common characteristics of
successful claims. Five cases involved couples that were still married, three
of which involved investments in a tax shelter. Some requesting spouses
were stay-at-home mothers, one was a paralegal, one was a police officer.
Like section 6015(b), section 6015(c) involves only the
understatement of taxes owed on a joint return; however, there is no
balancing of equitable factors. The least subjective means of relief, spouses
who request relief under section 6015(c) must be divorced, separated, or
widowed, but of the twenty-nine successful cases decided on the merits
solely under section 6015(c), two cases involved married couples where the
husband was in jail, seemingly in defiance of the regulations that do not treat
a temporary absence as a separation.139 With a presumption for the taxpayer,
one might expect to see fewer than thirty cases brought by requesting
spouses under section 6015(c) alone. Looking at these thirty cases plus the
twenty additional cases appealed on multiple grounds that were decided
based in part on section 6015(c), requesting spouses won on the merits in
thirty-four, plus an additional four on procedural issues. Although the
standard for the taxpayer is that he or she must prove the claim by a
preponderance of the evidence, the burden of proving the requesting spouse
had actual knowledge of the understatement, and thereby not qualified for
137. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-599, at 254 (1998).
138. NADLER, INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF, supra note 20, at 83.
139. Reg. § 1.6015-3(b)(3)(i).
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relief, is on the IRS.140 All but three of the successful cases on the merits
under section 6015(c) turned on lack of actual knowledge of the deficiency
by the requesting spouse.141
Sections 6015(b) and (c) provide relief only for the understatement
of tax liability; the tax returns themselves must be incorrect. Section 6015(f)
is broader and can provide relief for both the understatement and
underpayment of tax. In cases seeking section 6015(f) relief alone, 78.3
percent arose at least in part from the underpayment of tax on correctly filed
returns. The burden under section 6015(f) is on the taxpayer to prove the
equity of relief.142 However, courts have ruled that the Commissioner's
determination to deny relief under section 6015(f) is subject to de novo
review and that the administrative record may be supplemented at trial. 143
Not all Tax Court judges agree with this approach and neither does the IRS,
which contends that the requesting spouse must show that the
Commissioner's denial of relief was an abuse of discretion.14 4
As with section 6015(b), section 6015(f) requires a balancing of
equitable factors. Of the fifty-five cases granting relief on the merits solely
under section 6015(f), in sixteen the court found that the requesting spouse
had actual knowledge of the deficiency and, in six, that the requesting spouse
had reason to know of it. There was significant division in the cases on
whether the requesting spouse would suffer an economic hardship if made
liable for the tax. In only four did the court find that the requesting spouse
had substantially benefited from the deficiency. Finally, as with section
6015(b), there were no common characteristics of the requesting spouse.
140. NADLER, INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF, supra note 20, at 83-84. Under
section 6015(c), the burden of proving the appropriate allocation of tax items is on
the requesting spouse. I.R.C. § 6015(c)(2). In three of the cases granting section
6015(c) relief, issues of allocation were raised. In two of those cases, the court
chastised the IRS for not attempting an allocation. Foy v. Commissioner 89 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1299, 1304-05, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2005-116 at 923. Bulger v. Commissioner,
89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1457, 1462-63, T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-147 at 1140-41. In the final
case, the government worked through the allocation provisions when each spouse
sought relief, but the court granted only partial relief to the husband. Charlton v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 333 (2000).
141. Nevertheless, in seven cases the courts noted that the requesting
spouse either had constructive knowledge or reason to know of the liability.
142. NADLER, INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF, supra note 20, at 83-84.
143. Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010); Ewing
v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32, 38-39 (2004); Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203,
210 (2009), af'g 130 T.C. 115 (2008).
144. CC-2009-021, 2009 TNT 125-5; CC Notice (35)000-338 (2000). See
also Patrick J. Smith, Standards for Tax Court Review in Equitable Innocent Spouse
Cases, 2012 TNT 42-6. Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, Protecting the Innocent,
2000 TNT 181-100.
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Before beginning a more detailed analysis of when relief is granted,
it is important to note that not all of the litigated cases are meritorious.
Because taxpayers have a right to appeal a denial of relief by the IRS, some
claims that are invalid on their face have made their way onto the judicial
docket. For example, a threshold question for spouses to win relief from joint
and several liability is that spouses must sign or intend to sign joint returns.
Although the absence of a joint return is a common reason the IRS initially
declines relief, eight cases were decided based on a lack of a joint return and,
in each, the court held there was no jurisdiction for granting section 6015
relief. In one, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's denial of jurisdiction
for spouses who face joint liability under community property laws but do
not file joint returns. In a ninth case, one spouse claimed (but failed to
win) innocent spouse relief because the other spouse would not agree to file
jointly and, as a result, the requesting spouse suffered a larger tax bill.146
Whether a joint return exists is but one question that causes cases to
be decided on procedural grounds rather than on the merits.
CASES DECIDED ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
§ 6015(b) § 6015(c) § 6015(f) Combination Other
Brought
under 2 10 47 69 30
Won
under 0 2 18 23 7
Of the sample, 158, or 35.4 percent, were resolved based solely on
procedural issues, and taxpayers won 31.6 percent of the cases decided on
procedural grounds.147 In 50.6 percent of these procedural cases, issues of
untimeliness, res judicata, and lack of jurisdiction were the basis of the
court's decision.
That so many cases were decided on procedural issues is not
necessarily a sign of wasteful litigation. Many of these cases resolved
145. In Christensen v. Commissioner, 523 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 2008),
aff'g 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 642, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2005-299, a husband was jointly liable
under community property laws despite filing separately. There is no right to appeal
to the Tax Court under section 66 which provides limited community property relief.
146. Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-13.
147. In some cases, claims for some years were resolved on procedural and
other years on the merits. The Taxpayer Advocate found that 31% of the cases
decided in fiscal year 2010 involved procedural issues, with 55% decided in favor of
the government, 36% in favor of the taxpayer, and one split decision; 72% involved
an examination of the merits, and, of those, 62% were in favor of the IRS, 27% in
favor of the taxpayer, and 12% in split decision. NTA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 17, at 500.
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important questions: for example, they have questioned whether a particular
regulatory provision is valid and whether a right to intervene extends to
heirs. These developments occur in the courts because of the limited
guidance provided by the statute as well as taxpayers' relatively easy access
to the courts.
In the discussion below, procedural cases are included in the sample
unless otherwise stated. The reason for this inclusion is because, although an
exact percentage is unknown, most section 6015 claims are settled. 148
Procedural decisions that extend the period for negotiations between
requesting spouses and the IRS can operate to the advantage of either party.
However, one GAO report found that settlements generally operate to the
advantage of requesting spouses.149 Therefore, it is important to include in
consideration those decisions that prolong or shorten the process.
Nonetheless, more cases, 64.3 percent, were decided on the merits
than on procedural grounds, a large number under each subsection.
CASES DECIDED ON THE MERITS
combination of
§ 6015(b) § 6015(c) § 6015(f) (b), (c), &/or (f) other
Brought
under 14 20 110 139 4
Won on any
grounds 4 16 40 44 1
Winning
percentage 28.6% 80.0% 36.4% 31.7% 25.0%
Percentage of
total wins 3.8% 15.2% 38.1% 41.9% 1.0%
combination of
§ 6015(b) § 6015(c) § 6015(f) (b), (c), &/or (f) other
Won based on
section 11 29 54 6 5
Percentage of
total wins 10.5% 27.6% 51.4% 5.7% 4.8%
Taxpayers used section 6015(f) to seek relief much of the time, relying on
the provision, at least in part, in 83.6 percent of their appeals decided on the
merits. Taxpayers also tended to appeal under multiple provisions, claiming
under multiple provisions 48.4 percent of the time. Of 139 cases brought
under a combination of subsections, 108 were either a general section 6015
appeal or an appeal under all three subsections.
148. GAO, INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM, supra note 93, at 30.
149. Of the cases settled between 1996 and 2001, 55% resulted in the
taxpayer being absolved of liability, 33% in a reduction of liability, and 12% the
liability remained the same. Id.
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Judges, on the other hand, tended to provide relief under one
subsection and, like taxpayers, judges relied heavily on section 6015(f).
Despite some expectation that courts would grant "relatively few" section
6015(f) cases when requesting spouses had been denied relief on other
grounds, over 50 percent of the time that relief was granted, it was granted
under section 6015(f), which by definition, means the requesting spouse did
not qualify under section 6015(b) or (c). 15 0 Courts also used section 6015(c)
to grant relief when a taxpayer sought relief under a combination of
subsections.15 1
These results are not static over time. Taxpayers' reliance on section
6015(f) in cases decided on the merits has increased.
TAXPAYERS' RELIANCE OVER TIME
30 -- -- - - -------
25
20 - ---- - - -- -
-4-§6015(b)
15 
--- 5-§6015(c)
10 -- - - - -- -f-§6015(f)
5
0 V
The data shows an upward trend in appeals under section 6015(f) after a dip
in 2006, but a decline in the combination of appeals after a peak in 2004. A
question that cannot be answered from this data is why taxpayers would not
always appeal using at least some combination of section 6015(f).
150. Section 6015(f) was relied on alone 55 times and used in conjunction
with another subsection 4 more times. Johnson, The 1998 Act, supra note 89, at
1059. See also Smith, "Inequitable" Revenue Procedure, supra note 9. Id.
151. Section 6015(c) relief could be complete if the court allocated all
liability to the other spouse. See Reg. § 1.6015-3(d)(4).
152. The chart does not include cases decided in 2011 because the dataset
includes a shortened period.
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There are two things to note with respect to taxpayers' reliance on
the three subsections. First, there was a backlog of cases begun before 1998,
but this should not greatly affect the conclusions below regarding the
implementation of congressional intent because the same analysis should
have been applied to these holdover cases. It does mean, however, that there
might have been an artificially large number of cases in the early years as
taxpayers waited for the more lenient provision before pressing their cases in
court. Second, the decrease in the number of section 6015(f) cases in 2006
was likely the result of Ewing v. Commissioner,153 which held the then-
existing version of section 6015(e) did not grant the Tax Court jurisdiction to
decide subsection (f) claims in stand-alone appeals.154 Congress extended
this jurisdiction in December 2006.1ss
It is harder to draw conclusions based on successful cases because
there are few wins in any given year. Nevertheless, some trends can be seen.
COURTS' RELIANCE OVER TIME
12
8 - --- ---- .--- -4-§6015(b
6
-U-§6015(c
- -§6015(f)
Much as with taxpayers, judges' reliance on section 6015(f) has increased
over time, although judges were more willing to rely on section 6015(c) than
were taxpayers. The number of cases in which judges relied on a
combination of subsections has remained small.
3. Summary
As with most cases involving federal taxation, the vast majority of
innocent spouse cases are litigated in the Tax Court. Although some judges
appear to be more likely to grant relief than others, no pattern is discernible
regarding which types of judges are more likely to rule in favor of relief.
153. 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'g 122 T.C. 32 (2004).
154. Id. at 1015.
155. See supra note 79.
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From the data, courts appear most willing to grant relief under section
6015(c) and, thereby, to apportion liability between spouses. However,
courts are not unwilling to use section 6015(f) and to go to the merits of
these cases in deciding whether relief is warranted.
The factors gathered from the cases will be discussed more fully
below. This data allows us to evaluate the extent to which courts implement
the legislature's intent. As seen already, the broadening of the relief under
section 6015(f) was intended by Congress; the expectation was that the
equitable provision would give taxpayers a final means of relief and
taxpayers and judges are willing to use it as such. Below, the article
examines whether or not divorced, separated, or widowed wives who were
unfairly left crushing tax burdens by their nefarious husbands - women in
the factual situation with which Congress was concerned - are more or less
likely to be granted relief.
B. Characteristics ofRequesting Spouse
When Congress debated expanding innocent spouse relief in 1998,
its focus was on aiding divorced, separated, or widowed wives.is6 The
question addressed in this section is to what extent do those granted relief fit
this characterization.
1. Sex
Relief from joint and several liability is often perceived, both in
Congress and by academics, as relief for women. 157 Before the 1998 change
in law, 90 percent of petitioners for innocent spouse relief were women.
At that time, men won ten of the forty-two cases (or 23.8 percent) that they
brought at the trial level and women won ninety-two of 393 cases (or 23.4
percent) that they brought.' 5 9 Although their trial level winning percentages
were similar, men never won on appeal and women won sixteen times (but
had two opinions in their favor overturned).160
In the period since 1998, women have continued to bring most cases
for innocent spouse relief. The following chart includes all cases decided on
whatever grounds, grouped based on whose behalf relief was claimed. For
156. See supra notes 59-67; Finance Committee, supra note 58; Oversight
Subcommittee, supra note 55; 144 CONG. REC. S7647 (July 8, 1997).
157. See supra notes 59-67.
158. Zom, Innocent Spouses, supra note 117, at 424.
159. Id. at 425 n.10.
160. Id. at 425 n.10.
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example, if a husband claimed relief as beneficiary of his wife's estate, it was
coded as a wife's suit.161
GENDERED RELIEF
Brought Trial Case Won Trial Case
Wife Husband Both6 Wife Husband
338 59 4 128 16
Brought Appeal Won Appeal
37 5 0 8 | 0
From the evidence, Congress was right to identify innocent spouse relief as a
women's issue. Wives sought relief in 85.4 percent of total cases, 85.3
percent of the trial cases and 88.1 percent of appeals. Not only do women
bring more cases, courts appear to be more sympathetic to wives than to
husbands. Wives won 21.6 percent of their appeals and 37.4 percent of their
trials and husbands won 0.0 percent of their appeals and 25.4 percent of their
trial cases. As a result of the dominance wives have in bringing suit, wives
won 89.5 percent of total taxpayer victories.
Although women are more likely to litigate a claim for innocent
spouse relief, both spouses can apply for relief and, if they each win, allocate
liability between them.163 Because much relief is granted in earlier
administrative phases, it is hard to determine from the available data when
both spouses sought relief, although both spouses definitely sought relief in
four. If only one spouse is granted innocent spouse relief, the other remains
liable for the entire debt. In response to this continuing liability, some non-
requesting spouses have protested in court. Courts, however, have been
unsympathetic to non-requesting spouses who sought to reduce their liability
as a result of the other spouse being granted relief.
161. A non-requesting spouse might contest liability of the estate of a
requesting spouse if the statute of limitations has run against the non-requesting
spouse. See Jonson v. Commissioner, 353 1181, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2003). United
States v. Boscaljon, 105 A.F.T.R. 2d 1501 (2010) was excluded because the
government instigated the request.
162. This column reflects cases when each spouse independently sought
relief.
163. JoINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF PRESENT LAW
RELATING TO THE INNOCENT SPOUSE, OFFERS-IN-COMPROMISE, INSTALLMENT
AGREEMENT, AND TAXPAYER ADVOCATE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, 3 (JCX-22-01) (2001).
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2. Marital Status
As much as Congress identified innocent spouse relief as a women's
issue, Congress also identified it with divorced or separated women.16 The
requesting spouse's marital status at the time the couple filed the return and
at the time appeal was made to the courts can often be determined. For
purposes of the following chart, the couple was coded as separated, divorced,
or widowed if a couple was separated, divorced, or widowed for at least one
year for which a claim of relief was made. If the court noted that a spouse
was in the process of separating or divorcing, the couple was coded as
separated or divorced. These two choices highlight the number of requesting
spouses who were not in traditional relationships at the time of filing the
return or are more consistent with congressional sympathies at the time of
trial.
MARITAL STATUS OF THOSE SEEKING RELIEF
At time of filing At time of trial
Wife Husband Wife Husband
requesting requesting requesting requesting
Married 312 44 99 8
Separated (legally or
physically) 31 14 12 5
Divorced 11 3 210 45
Widowed 6 2 44 5
Other/never legally
married 20 4 13 4
Excluding those spouses for whom marital status is unknown or who were
never married, most couples were married (86.6 percent) when they filed but
divorced (59.6 percent) when they took their case to trial.165 Nevertheless,
forty-eight spouses (13.3 percent) filed the joint return when widowed,
separated, or divorced from the non-requesting spouse.
Also a significant number, 107, or 25.0 percent, sought relief from
joint and several liability while still married to the non-requesting spouse.
Many of these couples, 25.2 percent, faced liabilities as a result of an
investment in a tax shelter and 29.9 percent faced liabilities as a result of
unpaid taxes. In 86.7 percent of the litigated cases in which couples remained
married and knowledge of the unpaid tax or the unreported item was raised,
the requesting spouse was deemed to have some amount of knowledge, with
164. See supra text at notes 55-65.
165. The National Taxpayer Advocate reported that of those seeking relief
in 2001, 34% were single filers and 51% filed as "head of household." NTA, 2005
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 328. Thus, 85% were unmarried.
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40 percent having actual knowledge of the tax deficiency. These spouses are
not consistent with the stereotype portrayed by Congress when it enacted
expanded relief in 1998.
Examining the marital status of those winning relief, winning at
either the trial court or on appeal is coded a victory. If a spouse won on a
procedural matter or if a spouse won only in part, the claim was also coded
as victorious.
MARITAL STATUS OF WINNING TAXPAYERS
At time of filing At time of trial
Wife Husband Wife Husband
requesting requesting requesting requesting
Married 116 11 17 1
Separated (legally or
physically) 11 5 6 1
Divorced 3 0 92 14
Widowed 1 0 19 0
Other/never legally
married 6 2 4 1
As Congress focused heavily on divorced, separated, and widowed spouses
in 1998, so too the courts are more sympathetic to those spouses at trial.
Excluding those for whom marital status was not one of the traditional
categories, 132 of 150, or 88.0 percent, of successful spouses were separated,
divorced, or widowed at trial. Only 14.2 percent of those who remained
married were successful at trial. At the same time, it is best to have been
married when filing the return; 81.9 percent of those who were successful
were married at the time of the filing.
Some of these opinions reflect a traditional view of marriage. In
Korchak v. Commissioner,166 the court questioned:
Should she be punished for being a loving, trusting wife, a
homemaker and mother...? Had she asked any questions
about Madison Recycling, her husband and the accountant
would have reassured her... . It would be egregious to take
away her retirement at an age when she earned that right.
The innocent spouse relief was designed for these
circumstances. 167
166. 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 199, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2006-185.
167. Id., 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 199, 209, T.C.M. (RIA) 2006-185 at 1272.
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But meeting the traditional congressional archetype is not always enough to
win relief. In Torres v. Commissioner,168 an immigrant woman was held
responsible for her former husband's debts despite the IRS conceding that
she had no knowledge of the understatement of liability.169 Although the
court considered the case to be close, that she significantly benefited from
the understatement and would not suffer an economic hardship from paying
the tax "constrain us to conclude that it would not be inequitable to hold
petitioner liable." 170 Based on a balancing of equitable factors, the court held
this wife liable. 171
Few husbands claiming relief lived in non-traditional arrangements.
Nevertheless, husbands seeking relief who relied on their wives to handle
family finances won relief 38.5 percent of the time, which is more often than
husbands normally won. On the other hand, in Maluda v. Commissioner,172
an estranged wife took the money the husband claimed was designated to
pay the tax attributable to her husband's income.17 3 The court did not grant
him relief.174 In Stewart v. Commissioner,175 that the husband knew his wife
was employed was sufficient to overcome his claim that his wife handled all
of the family's finances.
3. Other Characteristics
Many members of Congress depicted innocent spouses as "women,
most of them working moms struggling to make ends meet."1 76 A review of
common characteristics of requesting spouses should shed light on whether
the courts shared an image of those worthy of relief. From the facts of the
cases, there is nothing distinctive about wives or husbands who seek relief.
For example, in twenty-six cases, requesting wives were teachers or former
teachers, in nineteen they were nurses or former nurses, in one she was a
168. T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-170.
169. Id.
170. Id.
17 1. Id.
172. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 545, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2009-28 1.
173. Id.
174. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 545, 546, T.C.M. (RIA) 12009-281 at 2040. The
husband stipulated to unfavorable facts. While the court wanted to grant relief, it felt
constrained not to. Id.
175. See T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-3 1.
176. 144 CONG. REC. S4493 (1998) (statement of Senator Spencer
Abraham). See also CONG. REC. H10003 (1997) (statement of Representative Jerry
Weller), S1072 (statement of Senator Al D'Amato), S4473 (statement of Senator
Bob Graham), H5356 (statement of Representative Johnson); Finance Committee,
supra note 58 (statement of Chairman Johnson).
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producer at ABC and another two had PhDs, and in five they had attended
law school. In two cases the requesting husband was guilty of a crime related
to the tax filing; in eight the husband was trained as a lawyer or had (or was
obtaining) his MBA; and in four the wife had embezzled the unreported
income. Thus, there were many different types of people who requested
innocent spouse relief.
The following chart provides information regarding the education
level of the requesting spouse.
EDUCATION LEVEL
Requesting Relief Winning Relief
Husband Wife Total Husband Wife Total
Less
than high
school 2 9 11 1 7 8(72.7%)
High
school!
GED 4 39 43 0 19 19(44.2%)
Some
college
or less
than 4
year
degree 4 28 32 3 13 16(50.0%)
College
degree 12 69 81 3 23 26 (32.1%)
Post-
graduate 8 15 23 1 5 6(26.1%)
Spouses did better than average when the court mentioned the requesting
spouse's education level. Compared to the total average winning percentage
of 34.7 percent, these spouses won 39.5 percent of their claims. The amount
of education and the perception of education also matter, with those having
lesser education generally doing better. In three of the four cases in which
the court found the requesting spouse was well or highly educated, judges
denied relief. For the three claims with graduate degrees in business, one
won in small part. Of the eight claims for relief made by lawyers, all lost.
Because Congress depicted innocent spouses as those who were
struggling with the tax burden (sometimes as housewives and sometimes as
single working mothers), the following chart examines their employment,
both at the filing and at the trial.177
177. Compare Finance Committee, supra note 58, at [8] and [176].
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EMPLOYMENT
Requ sting Relief Winning Relief
Husband Wife Total Husband Wife Total
Non-requesting
spouse primary
earner at filing 2 72 74 0 36 36
Non-requesting
spouse not
primary earner at
filing 38 169 207 11 58 69
Not employed at
trial 2 47 49 1 25 26
Employed at trial 33 148 181 9 48 57
From a small sample, when husbands requested relief and their wives were
the couples' primary earners, husbands never won relief. More surprisingly,
if husbands requested relief when their wives were not the primary earners,
husbands won 28.9 percent of the time. On the other hand, when wives
requested relief and their husbands were primary earners, wives won relief
50.0 percent of the time; and if the non-requesting husband was not the
primary earner, the wife won 34.3 percent of the time. Judges also granted
relief to 53.1 percent of those requesting spouses noted not to be employed at
the time of the trial and only to 31.5 percent of those who were then
employed.
Finally, Congress concluded, "perhaps most egregious of all . . .
[collection] efforts are often undertaken without regard to the impact that
they will have on the welfare of the innocent children involved. . . ."
CARE FOR DEPENDENT CHILDREN
ReC uesting Relief Winning Relief
Husband Wife Total Husband Wife Total
Caring for
children 10 73 83 2 35 37
Almost 45 percent of requesting spouses who were noted as caring for
dependent children were granted relief.
Although not mentioned by Congress, one characteristic that might
be important for winning relief in the courts is whether the requesting spouse
is represented by counsel at trial.179
178. Id. at [22].
179. For fiscal year 2010, thirty-six section 6015 cases were appealed to the
courts, of which 56% of the requesting parties were pro se. This was the lowest
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REPRESENTATION
Requesting Relief Winning Relief
Husband Wife Total Husband Wife Total
Represented 22 182 204 4 68 72
Pro se 45 198 243 13 69 82
Wives (47.9 percent) are more likely than husbands (32.8 percent) to be
represented when appealing the denial of innocent spouse relief. However,
representation does not appear to be a critical matter for determining whether
a spouse wins. In total, 35.3 percent of represented spouses won; 33.7
percent won when they were pro se. On the other hand, wives won 37.4
percent of the time when they were represented and 34.8 percent when they
were pro se; husbands won 18.2 percent when they were represented but 28.9
percent when they were pro se. Included in those who were pro se are eleven
cases in which either the requesting spouse or the non-requesting spouse, if
the couple remained married, was an attorney. In those eleven cases (of
which six wives were the requesting spouse), the requesting spouse lost each
time.
4. Summary
From the available evidence, courts appear to share Congress's
expectations that wives will request innocent spouse relief and that certain
types of wives are more likely to be the intended beneficiaries of relief. For
example, having a marital status both when filing the return and litigating in
court that conforms to stereotypes can be helpful in winning relief. The
existence of traditional marital relationships does not always work for or
against requesting wives, although husbands who take untraditional roles
find it hard to win relief.
Although other characteristics of requesting spouses vary greatly,
those spouses most likely to win are those that conform to congressional
archetypes, such as those who are unemployed or care for dependent
children. Those without a high school education are more likely than their
percentage among the ten most litigated issues. NTA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 17, at 416. Of the twenty cases in which the taxpayer was pro se, the taxpayer
prevailed in whole or in part six times, or 30%. Id. at 417. When the taxpayer was
represented, in sixteen cases, the taxpayer prevailed eight times, or 50%, the most
successful among the top ten issues. Id. Leandra Lederman and Warren B. Hrung,
Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Effects on
Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1235, 1282 (2006),
conclude that represented clients do better in Tax Court litigation.
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more educated counterparts to win relief. The need for representation is less
clear, although it is more helpful for wives than husbands.
C. Nature of the Tax Burden
In its 1998 debates, Congress concentrated on spouses burdened by
an "unfair obligation" who "have become financially wiped out when they
find themselves liable for taxes, interest, and penalties because of actions by
their spouse of which they were unaware." This section explores to what
extent do those granted relief fit this characterization.
1. Unfair Burden
a. Source ofLiability
As Congress considered the circumstances surrounding the
generation of tax liabilities, so too might those circumstances influence
whether a court perceives a burden as unfair. For example, courts might be
less sympathetic if the deficiency arose from an investment in a tax shelter or
if large, or small, amounts of revenue are at stake. On the other hand, that the
requesting spouse's subsequent refunds are used to pay an old debt might be
more sympathetic than if the spouse is litigating other tax issues and innocent
spouse relief is only one of many taxpayer defenses.
The section 6015 cases reflect many sources of liability. In cases
with multiple issues, each issue was counted separately.
SOURCE OF LIABILITY
Unpaid Unreported Disallowed Disallowed Other Not
tax income tax shelter deductions provided
Number of
cases 180 110 50 45 41 40
Percentage
of cases 38.6% 23.6% 10.7% 9.7% 8.8% 8.6%
Number
won 65 36 14 22 12 14
Winning
percentage 37.8% 32.7% 28.0% 48.9% 29.3% 35.0%
Most cases seeking innocent spouse relief involved properly reported but
unpaid tax. With respect to these appeals, courts granted relief more often
than the average success rate for innocent spouse cases of 34.4 percent. Tax
returns that understated couples' income are both appealed less frequently
than unpaid tax cases and have a lower winning percentage, despite the fact
180. 144 CONG. REc. S1072 (statement of Senator D'Amato); S4511 (1998)
(statement of Senator Dodd).
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that underreporting of taxes constitutes a much larger proportion of the gross
tax gap than the underpayment of taxes.18 There were significantly fewer
cases involving disallowed deductions, but their winning percentage was
much higher.
Of the twenty-four cases when courts noted the culpability of
requesting spouses beyond that of mere knowledge of the tax deficiency,
requesting spouses lost all of their claims. On the other hand, in the ten
opinions noting that the requesting spouse was not culpable in the tax
evasion, the requesting spouse won 60 percent of the time. For investments
in tax shelters specifically, spouses who had invested in tax shelters appealed
an IRS denial of relief fifty times. Requesting spouses involved with the
invalidation of tax shelters were granted relief 28.0 percent of the time. One
law firm, Merriam, Pierson, and Gellner, litigated sixteen cases that arose
from tax shelters, each involving buyers of interests in fraudulent
partnerships, and won one case in which the IRS conceded it did not prove
the requesting spouse had actual knowledge of the investment and three
cases for litigation costs because the IRS did not initially grant relief.
In general, a significant source of tax avoidance is self-employment
income. Self-employed taxpayers have relatively low overall compliance
rates, at 43 percent, compared to those who earn wages, where taxpayers pay
approximately 98 percent of their taxes.182 Because of these lower
compliance rates, self-employed spouses might unfairly leave their mates
with unpaid tax bills. In 103 cases, or 23.2 percent of all section 6015 cases,
the non-requesting spouse was self-employed and courts granted relief in
50.5 percent. On the other hand, in twenty-seven cases, 6.1 percent, the
requesting spouse was self-employed and, in that context, won relief in only
22.2 percent. Thus, self-employment by non-requesting spouses appears to
increase the chance of relief being granted while the self-employment of
requesting spouses decrease it.
Who prepares the couple's tax return may also play a role in how a
court will perceive the source of liability. For the following chart, twenty-
seven returns were counted as both spouse-prepared and professional /
software prepared if one spouse was stated to work closely with the return
preparer or to use the software.
181. Underreporting of the individual income tax constitutes $235 billion
and the underpayment of all taxes is $46 billion. IRS News Release, IRS estimates
$450 Billion Gross Tax Gap for 2006, Table 1, 2012 TNT 5-5 1.
182. IRS News Release, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates, IR 2006-28 (Feb.
14, 2006) (accompanying charts). Nina Olson, Olson Testifies on Fairness in IRS
Enforcement, 2007 TNT 44-28.
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RETURN PREPARER
Wife Wife Husband Husband Profes- Shelter
prepares prepares/ prepares prepares/ sional promoter
& seeks husband & seeks wife seeks preparer
relief seeks relief relief relief /software
Number
ofcases 17 8 13 42 135 17
Percent-
age of
cases 3.8% 1.8% 2.9% 9.5% 30.4% 3.8%
Number
won 6 6 3 22 50 5
Winning
percent-
age 35.3% 75.0% 23.1% 52.4% 37.0% 29.4%
In 239, or 53.8 percent, of section 6015 cases, the court did not indicate who
prepared the return. However, in thirty cases that do make this observation,
the spouse seeking relief also prepared the return. In these cases, the
requesting spouse's success rate was 30 percent, but women did significantly
better than men. On the other hand, a wife requesting relief when her
husband prepared the return won 52.4 percent of the time, but a husband
requesting relief when his wife prepared the return won 75 percent of the
time. Spouses' success rate when a shelter promoter prepared the return is
less than spouses' success rate in cases involving tax shelter investments
generally.
As shown below, who handled family finances was used as an
indicator of knowledge of the source of the liability in 34.7 percent of cases.
FAMILY FINANCES
Wife Husband
Wife controls Husband controls
controls finances / controls finances /
finances & husband finances & wife seeks Separate Both
seeks relief seeks relief seeks relief relief finances controlled
Number of
cases 39 13 2 73 12 15
Percentage
of cases 25.3% 8.4% 1.3% 47.4% 7.8% 9.7%
Number 2
won 10 5 0 43 11
Winning
percentage 25.6% 38.5% 0% 58.9% 91.7% 13.3%
Judges noted most frequently when the husband controlled the finances and
the wife sought relief, and they granted relief in these cases 58.9 percent of
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the time.183 Similarly, when wives controlled the finances and husbands
sought relief, courts granted relief more than the average success rate. 184
Courts are most likely to grant relief when judges note that couples keep
their finances separate. If both spouses participate in family finances (or
husbands handle the finances and then seek relief), relief is much harder to
obtain.
Similarly, although the subset is small, working in the same business
with the non-requesting spouse affects the courts' decisions, unless the
requesting spouse is clearly a dependent worker. For example, in Sykes v.
Commissioner,185 the wife kept the records for her husband's law practice
and was held liable for taxes on income the business generated. On the other
hand, In Harper v. Commissioner,186 the wife sometimes drove patients at a
substance abuse treatment facility operated by her husband but otherwise had
no knowledge of the business's finances, and she was held not responsible
for knowing of the operation's income.
Finally, what caused the requesting spouse to initiate the request
might impact judges' perception of the tax burden. In 17.1 percent of section
6015 cases, the court noted that the government had used the requesting
spouse's refund, garnished wages or accounts, or imposed a levy on property
in order to satisfy the liability. In 7.6 percent of those cases, the court granted
relief. In 12.8 percent of all section 6015 cases, the court noted that the
government had issued a notice of determination or intent to collect and, in
33.3 percent of these cases, the court granted relief. Finally, in 4.1 percent of
cases the court noted that the requesting spouse was litigating other tax
issues and, in 44.4 percent, the court granted relief. This result could lead one
to conclude that judges do not weigh this factor significantly when
considering relief for requesting spouses.
183. For example, in Doyle v. Commissioner, 94 Fed. Appx. 949 (3d Cir.
2004), despite having only a high school education, the wife was held to know about
a horse breeding tax shelter because of her role writing family checks and handling
household expenses. "Nancy certainly should have been alerted to the prospect that
'something is rotten in the state of Denmark' when she signed a tax return that
deducted almost 70% of the couple's gross income-something that on its face
reduced the family's apparent income to a level totally at odds with the couple's
lifestyle." Id. at 952.
184. When a husband relied on his wife to handle the family's finances, as
his mother had done when he was a child, the court held he still had a duty to
inquire. Molsbee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 331, 332, T.C.M. (RIA)
2009-231 at 1732.
185. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 105, 151, 156, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-197 at 1473-
74, 1480.
186. T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-153.
[Vol. 12:8672
HeinOnline  -- 12 Fla. Tax Rev. 672 2012
Empirical Study ofInnocent Spouse Relief
b. Knowledge ofLiability
Committee reports, and many statements made on the congressional
floor, stressed that an innocent spouse has no knowledge of his or her
spouse's actions.1 87 In two of the methods for obtaining relief under § 6015,
Congress included the requesting spouse's knowledge of the tax deficiency
as a factor in determining whether the spouse was unfairly saddled with a tax
burden. Congress did not include knowledge of liability in the more open-
ended equitable relief of section 6015(f); but, under the Treasury
Department's rules interpreting section 6015(f), knowledge is included as an
equitable factor.189
For cases decided on the merits (so that knowledge would be a
consideration), the requesting spouse's knowledge was raised in 269 cases,
or 93.7 percent. Moreover, in six cases decided on procedural grounds, for
which knowledge is not a deciding factor, the court noted that the requesting
spouse had knowledge or reason to know and, sided with the government in
all but one. Therefore, it is unsurprising that when a wife conceded
knowledge but argued it was "legally irrelevant" the court disagreed. 190
Whether imposed by Congress or the Treasury Department, what the
knowledge standard is depends on the type of relief the requesting spouse is
claiming. For purposes of section 6015(b) and (f), whether the requesting
spouse knew, or had reason to know, of the understatement (or
underpayment for section 6015(f)) is determined by whether the IRS can
prove the spouse actually knew of the deficiency or whether a reasonable
person in similar circumstances would have known. 191 The IRS may deny
relief if the taxpayer had reason to know of the cause of the deficiency,
although it is only one factor to be weighed pursuant to the equity prong.
Until the IRS's recent proposed changes, however, actual knowledge, was "a
187. See H. Rep. No. 105-174; H. Rep. 105-599; 144 Cong. Rec. S4492
(statement of Barbara Boxer), S4500 (statement of Dianne Feinstein), S1072 and
H7623 (statement of William Roth), and S7653 (statement of Carol Moseley-Braun).
188. I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(C); I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C). Knowledge is tested at
the time the original return was filed to encourage
married couples to file amended returns. See Billings v. Commissioner, 94
T.C.M. (CCH) 183, 186-87, T.C.M. (RIA) 2007-234 at 1426 (2007).
189. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298; Notice 2012-8, §
4.03(2)(c), supra note 9.
190. Mellen v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 530, 538, T.C.M. (RIA)
2002-280 at 1703 (2002).
191. Reg. § 1.6015-2(c). Before 1998, the courts gave the explanation that
spouses had "reason to know" for denying relief approximately 55% of the time.
Zom, Innocent Spouses, supra note 117, at 425.
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strong factor weighing against equitable relief' in cases where taxes are
understated on the return.
How to judge what one should reasonably know depends both on the
cause of the tax liability and how the judge applies the test. For cases of
underpayment of taxes on correctly filed returns, the IRS questions whether
the requesting spouse had reason to know the non-requesting spouse would
not pay the tax. 193 Similarly, the IRS considers whether the requesting
spouse did not know or have reason to know of the item giving rise to the
deficiency when taxes are understated. 194
Courts' applications of these tests are not so clear, particularly when
evaluating understatements. For example, for income understated on the
return, the question can be whether the requesting spouse knew of the
underlying transaction producing the income or should have known (or
questioned) about additional income based on family expenses.195 For
overstated deductions, that requesting spouses must know of the underlying
transaction can be applied as whether a reasonable person looking at the
return would question whether the deduction was odd and so trigger an
obligation to inquire or as whether the requesting spouse had actual
knowledge of the transaction that produced the overstated deduction. 196
Unlike section 6015(b) and (f), in section 6015(c), which provides
for apportioned relief, Congress placed the burden on the IRS to prove that
the requesting spouse had actual knowledge of the understatement to the
satisfaction of the courts. Actual knowledge is meant to be a higher
standard than the reason to know test provided in section 6015(b) and (f);
however, scholars complain that it has been interpreted by the courts to
require only knowledge of the underlying transaction and that this
192. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298; Notice 2012-8, §
4.03(2)(c)(i), supra note 9.
193. Id.
194. Id. The Regulations adopt a facts and circumstances test. Reg. §
1.6015-2(c), 3(c)(2)(B)(1).
195. Compare Mitchell v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 800, 803-04 (D.C. Cir.
2002) with Ohrman v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 499, 503, T.C.M. (RIA)
2003-301 at 1666 (2003), af'd, Ohrman v. Commissioner, 157 Fed. Appx. 997 (9th
Cir. 2005).
196. Compare Hopkins v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 73, 80 (2003) with
Phemister v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 163, 171, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2009-201
at 1503 (2009). In Price v. Commissioner, referenced in forty-seven cases in this
sample, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that since erroneous deductions are necessarily
reported on a tax return, any spouse who signs the joint return is put on notice that an
income-producing transaction occurred. 887 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1989).
197. I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C). This has been interpreted to mean actual
knowledge of the factual circumstances which gave rise to the erroneous deductions.
See King v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 198, 204 (2001); Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(2)(B)(2).
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"weaken[s] the intended remedial effect."198 The Treasury Department states
that if the requesting spouse made a "deliberate effort" to avoid learning
about the taxes owed or jointly owned the property, the IRS can conclude the
spouse had actual knowledge. 1 99
The following chart examines the pes of knowledge that courts
have found in cases decided on the merits. As discussed above, although
cases were often brought under a combination of subsections, courts tended
to grant relief under only one subsection.
FINDINGS OF KNOWLEDGE
_ 6015(b) 4 601 (c) 601: (f) 6015(b), (c), and/or (f)
Brought Wins Brought Wins Brought Wins Brought Wins
Court finds
actual
knowledge 6 - 3 4 31 13 68 1
Court finds
constructive
knowledge or
reason to
know 2 - 2 4 41 6 33 3
Spouse or IRS
concedes
knowledge 1 - - 0 5 1 2 -
Court finds
no knowledge 4 11 11 15 26 30 24 5
Unknown; not
discussed I - 4 3 4 3 5 -
When taxpayers won under section 6015(b), the court always found
that the requesting spouse did not know or have reason to know of the
deficiency. This was not the case for wins under section 6015(f) or section
6015(c), the latter being unexpected because one of section 6015(c)'s
requirements is that the requesting spouse must not have actual knowledge of
the deficiency. For 56.6 percent of requesting spouses who won under
section 6015(f), the court found no knowledge, but in 37.7 percent of the
cases won under section 6015(f), the requesting spouse either had actual
knowledge or reason to know of the deficiency. The results are similar under
section 6015(c). For 57.7 percent of requesting spouses who won under
section 6015(c), the court found no knowledge of the deficiency. However,
198. I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C); Beck, Failure, supra note 20, at 948. See also
Attestatova, Bonds of Joint Tax Liability, supra note 20, at 863-64, Senators Bob
Graham, Al D'Amato, Dianne Feinstein, and Tim Johnson introduced an amendment
to make the actual knowledge test apply at the time the individual signed the return.
144 CONG. REC. S4544 (1998) (Proposed Amendments to H.R. 2676).
199. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(iv). Requesting spouses can overcome actual
knowledge if they were victims of domestic violence and did not challenge the filing
for fear of retaliation. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c)(v).
200. Cases for litigation costs or on other grounds are omitted from the
chart.
6752012]
HeinOnline  -- 12 Fla. Tax Rev. 675 2012
Florida Tax Review
in 15.4 percent of the cases in which a spouse won under section 6015(c), the
court found actual knowledge; and in 11.5 percent, the court did not discuss
knowledge despite it being a requirement for deciding relief on the merits.
Courts found constructive knowledge when a requesting spouse did
not review the completed return or signed a blank return. Requesting spouses
were expected to know what they signed unless they were prevented from
reviewing the return. In twenty-six of the cases decided on the merits, judges
found that there was constructive knowledge.201 In addition, in Jones v.
Commissioner,202 the court found that if a requesting spouse was on notice
that the other spouse had unreported income but did not know the exact
amount of income, the requesting spouse must fulfill a duty of inquiry or risk
being charged with constructive knowledge of the understatement.
Nevertheless, the requesting spouse in Jones was granted relief under section
6015(f) after balancing all of the factors weighing for equitable relief.
In several cases, spouses were required to exercise greater di2igence
than simply requesting information. In Cheshire v. Commissioner and
Wiksell v. Commissioner,204 wives noticed either an ineligible deduction or
unreported income on the return and asked about the tax consequences of the
mistakes. For that reason, they were held to have actual knowledge of the
deficiency and, ultimately, denied relief.
Much as ignorance of what is on the return provides little relief,
ignorance of the law is unlikely to win relief if it means relieving one spouse
completely, despite the ABA's 1995 proposal that would have allowed
ignorance of the law as a defense.205 In the seven cases in which a spouse
claimed reliance on bad advice, either from a return preparer or tax software,
the resulting ignorance of the law was no excuse for lack of knowledge. In
one case, a wife who prepared the couple's tax return failed to win relief
because she had incorrectly relied on an accountant's opinion that certain of
her former husband's disability income was excluded from tax.206 In another
case, the wife signed relying relied on her divorce attorney's incorrect
201. But see Sunleaf v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283, 1286,
T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2009-052 at 413-14 (2009) (Wife who relied on her husband to file
the returns and, therefore, did not review them, was granted relief).
202. 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1457, 1460, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-112 at 667
(2010). See also Kruse v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 524, 525, T.C.M.
(RIA) 2010-270 at 1636 (2010); Pierce v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-
126.
203. 282 F.3d 326, 300 (5th Cir. 2002).
204. Wiksell v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2360, 2367, T.C.M.
(RIA) 94,099 at 94-485 (1994), rev'd, Wiksell v. Commissioner, 90 F.3d 1459
(9th Cir. 1996).
205. ABA, Proceedings of the 1995 Midyear Meeting, supra note 51, at 5-
6.
206. Jaske v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-85.
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explanation of the creation of loss "credits."207 In both cases, reliance was to
their detriment.
Judges also hold that lack of knowledge of joint and several liability
is no excuse but with greater reservation. In Kelly v. Commissioner,208 a wife
claimed that she believed she had to file jointly because she was married.
"On the basis of the level of petitioner's education, the amount of her control
over the filing of the tax returns, and her extensive communication with the
tax preparer, the Court finds this argument unpersuasive. Even if petitioner
did not have a comprehensive understanding of tax laws, she had reason to
know of her joint and several liability for the taxes shown on the joint
returns." 209 In Washington v. Commissioner,210 a wife "was under the
impression that she was required to file a joint return because she was
married at the time" (although she had previously filed as married filing
separately).211 After balancing equitable factors, the court granted relief but
not on the basis of ignorance of the law.
Judges are more sensitive to claims of ignorance of the law when
relief is being granted under section 6015(c). In Mora v. Commissioner,212
both spouses relied on a tax shelter promoter but the liability was allocated to
the husband. Similarly, in King v. Commissioner,213 the husband, a used car
salesman, also owned a cattle ranch. The wife kept the records for the
venture and prepared the couple's tax returns. The Tax Court sustained the
wife's separation of liability under section 6015(c) because the tax treatment
of the venture depended upon the husband's subjective intent to make a
profit. Although the wife knew of the business, the IRS was required to
prove that the wife knew that the ranch operated as a hobby and not for
profit.
The Treasury Department supports a stronger position against
ignorance of the law defenses for fear that it would necessarily lead to further
expansion of this defense: "There is no apparent reason why the tax liability
of both spouses should not be excused if they both did not understand the tax
consequences of their transaction."214 In other words, both spouses may be
equally ignorant so that it might inequitable to excuse one but not both from
the liability. In this sample, no court has responded to this concern.
207. Estate of Gurr, T.C. Summ. Op. 2002-7.
208. 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 507, 512, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-267 at 1615
(2010).
209. Id.
210. 120 T.C. 137, 202 (2003).
211. Id.
212. 117 T.C. 279, 281 (2001).
213. 116 T.C. 198, 205-06 (2001).
214. REPORT ON JOINT LIABILITY, supra note 13, at 51. See also T.D. 9003,
supra note 128, at 29.
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Ignorance of the law is, therefore, sometimes an excuse. Ignorance
of the facts underlying the return tends to be more leniently considered,
although this standard is not applied consistently. For example, in Braden v.
Commissioner,215 the court held that a husband had no knowledge of the
deficiency despite knowing his former wife had received a distribution from
her father's estate. "Although Ms. Braden certainly was in a position to know
that the distributions came from her father's IRA's, the record does not
contain any evidence that she or anyone else told petitioner that the
distributions consisted of IRA withdrawals and interest income or gave him
any reason to conclude the distributions were taxable.' 2 16 On the other hand,
in Charlton v. Commissioner,217 a husband was not allowed to rely upon
summaries of Schedule C expenditures provided by his wife when he
prepared the couple's returns.
The question runs through these cases of what a spouse, particularly
a wife, can be expected to know about family finances. However, the more a
requesting spouse is told about family finances, the more likely the spouse is
to be held knowledgeable of tax deficiencies.218 It is hard to win relief if a
spouse discusses finances with the requesting spouse even if the requesting
spouse ultimately defers.219 It is also hard to win relief if the judge finds that
the spouse should have known more about the family's finances. In Alt v.
Commissioner,220 a doctor funneled his earnings through dozens of
corporations to reduce the couple's tax liability. The court was unpersuaded
by the argument that the doctor's wife, a college-educated, 74-year-old
woman "was reared in a culture that demanded women refrain from
questioning [the] breadwinner regarding fiscal matters."221 Of course, not all
couples in traditional relationships that limit access to information fare so
215. 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1380, 1383, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2001-069 at 527
(2001).
216. Id.
217. 114 T.C. 333, 336 (2000). See also Capehart v. Commissioner, 204
Fed. Appx. 618, 620 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'g, Capehart v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA)
2004-268 (2004); Grossman v. Commissioner, 182 F.3d 275, 231 (4th Cir. 1999).
218. Compare Sowards v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1517, 1529,
T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2003-180 at 970-71 (2003), with Pierce v. Commissioner, 85
T.C.M. (CCH) 1553, 1560, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2003-188 at 1007-08 (2003).
219. See Golden v. Commissioner, 548 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2008).
220. 101 Fed. Appx. 34, 42 (6th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 1000
(2004). In one pre-1998 case, Judge Mary Ann Cohen refused to allow a wife to seek
innocent spouse relief after her husband pursued a different tax case covering the
same tax year. The court found she "implicitly authorized" her husband to pursue the
case and assumed that "it would be taken care of' by her husband. Levin v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2938, 2942, T.C.M. (RIA) 96,211 at 96-1558
(1996).
221. Alt, 101 Fed. Appx. at 42.
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badly. In thirty-two cases in which there was a traditional relationship,
defined as the requesting spouse not working outside the home (unless
working for the non-requesting spouse) and not handling family finances, the
requesting spouse won 68.8 percent of the time.
From this review, the application of the knowledge or reason to
know standard does have a significant amount of inconsistency. Reliance on
judges to determine the credibility of witnesses is a necessary part of
evaluating this factor. Witness credibility was specifically raised in 110
cases, or 24.8 percent.
CREDIBILITY
Number of Husband Wife
Cases Wins Wins
Both credible 4 0 3
Neither credible 7 0 1
Husband credible 13 5 4
Husband not credible 5 0 1
Wife credible 54 0 37
Wife not credible 26 0 4
IRS credible 1 0 0
To the extent that one thinks the judicial system is good at evaluating
witnesses, this is less a concern than for those who are more skeptical of
judicial wisdom. One thing is clear, the knowledge factor is not a rote check-
the-box formulation.
c. Benefit from Liability
Richard Beck argues that the Treasury Department did not support
the repeal of joint and several liability because "it saw hobgoblins of abuse
waiting to pounce, in the form of fraudulent schemes where one spouse
would transfer all the couple's assets to the other to put them beyond the
I.R.S.'s reach." 222 Congress shared this fear. When Congress expanded
innocent spouse relief, it was concerned that taxpayers would transfer assets
to avoid paying taxes and that some requesting spouses would unfairly
receive tax relief.223 Only those who were unfairly left with a tax bill should
be relieved of liability.224
222. Beck, Failure, supra note 20, at 948 n.87.
223. See Finance Committee, supra note 58, at 183 (statement of Sen. John
Chafee); 144 CONG. REC. 7623 (1998) (statement of Sen. William Roth); H.R. REP.
NO. 105-599, at 253-54 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-364, pt. 1, at 152-53 (1997).
224. See notes 58-68.
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According to the Treasury Department, if a requesting spouse
received a significant benefit from the underpayment of taxes, requiring the
requesting spouse to pay the tax is not inequitable.225 However, a significant
benefit is only one factor to be considered under the equitable prong of
sections 6015(b) and (f) as a means of measuring whether the requesting
spouse would unfairly benefit from liability relief. There is no reference to
significant benefit in section 6015(c), which does not have an equity
component, although an allocation is prohibited if spouses transferred
property to avoid tax.226
One critic claims that the "law-abiding spouse often receives no
financial benefit from the other spouse's underpayment," 227 but the courts do
not share this view. Whether a spouse significantly benefits from a tax
deficiency has been held the most important factor of equity.228 In 169 of the
cases decided on the merits, the issue of significant benefit was raised.
SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT
Court
Court finds Court finds
significant finds no IRS concedes factor
benefit benefit no benefit neutral
Number of cases 76 68 20 5
Taxpayer wins 35 7 13 0
When the court found that the requesting spouse enjoyed no significant
benefit from the tax deficiency, the requesting spouse won relief in 51.5
percent of cases; when the IRS conceded there was no benefit, the requesting
spouse won 65.0 percent of the time. On the other hand, when the court
found the requesting spouse did benefit, relief was granted in 9.2 percent of
cases.
The issue of significant benefit was raised more often under section
6015(f) than under section 6015(b) because there are more section 6015(f)
cases, but there was no meaningful difference in how the factor was used if
the case was won under section 6015(b) or (f). This factor was raised in only
two cases decided on section 6015(c) alone, despite section 6015(c) not
requiring an equitable analysis.
Regulations define whether a requesting spouse significantly
benefited from a tax deficiency as whether the spouse received a benefit
225. Reg. § 1.6015-2(d); Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296,299.
226. I.R.C. § 6015(c)(4).
227. Christian, Joint and Several Liability, supra note 20, at 570-71.
228. Cheshire v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2002).
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beyond normal support.229 However, the regulations fail to define normal
support. Evidence of a benefit may, but does not have to, consist of transfers
of property between spouses made at any time.230 The example provided in
the regulations is of a spouse receiving life insurance proceeds beyond
normal support and the insurance premiums are traceable to items omitted
from gross income.231 In the two cases involving life insurance, one found
there was a significant benefit and the other did not. In Bozick v.
Commissioner, 23 the court held that a requesting spouse received insurance
proceeds, not because of the tax avoidance, but "because her husband paid
for the life insurance policy throughout his lifetime. . . ."233 On the other
hand, in George v. Commissioner,234 the court held that if a husband had
paid his taxes, there would have been less in the IRA or insurance for the
wife to receive on his death.
Struggling to apply this factor, judges have not agreed on what it
means to create a significant benefit. 23 Improving cash flows, even if the
money was reinvested in the tax shelter generating the cash flows, is
sometimes a significant benefit to both spouses.236  Similarly, paying a
child's college tuition may be a significant benefit to both spouses.237 Thus,
as with the knowledge standard, there is uncertainty in the application of this
factor.
229. Reg. § 1.6015-2(d).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1242, 1244, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2010-61 at 355 (2010).
233. Id.
234. T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-261 at 1581 (2004).
235. The government expects that the test for determining whether there is
an economic benefit to be harder to apply in states where couples live under a
community property regime; however, this arose in only one case and, in it, the court
held that the wife was unlikely to receive any benefit from community funds. IRS
Releases Publication on Innocent Spouse Relief 2008 TNT 71-63 (April 8, 2008);
Haltom v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2005-209 at 1597 (2005).
236. Compare Capehart v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2004-268 at
1642 (2004), aff'd, Capehart v. Commissioner, 204 Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 2006),
Juell v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 143, 148, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2007-219 at
1372-73 (2007), and Abelein v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-274 at 1718
(2004). See also Casula v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-49; Wizen v.
Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-99.
237. In the one case where the requesting spouse was being sent to college
during the years of tax deficiency, this expenditure was held not to be a significant
benefit. Griffin v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-41.
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Ambiguity also exists in the weight to be given to this factor and
who bears the burden of proof. In Schultz v. Commissioner,238 the court held
that when the IRS did not prove that the requesting spouse significantly
benefited from the tax deficiency, whether the requesting spouse received a
significant benefit was a neutral factor that weighed in favor of relief. Thus,
the burden of roof was on the IRS. On the other hand, in Smolen v.
Commissioner,239 the court concluded that there was no evidence that the
taxpayer did not receive a significant benefit and, therefore, the factor
weighed against relief. In Smolen, the taxpayer bore the burden of proof.
Both cases were brought under section 6015(f).
Perception of the couple's lifestyle might influence a judge's
willingness to find a significant benefit. When a couple enjoys a lavish
lifestyle, it is harder for the requesting spouse to claim there was no such
benefit. In twenty-two of the cases in which a significant benefit was found,
the court portrayed the couple as well off, and in only one of those cases was
the requesting spouse granted relief. The court frequently questions whether
there was an extravagant lifestyle and, if not, finds there was no significant
benefit regardless of the amount of taxes avoided. 240
Whether a judge will find that a couple lived lavishly is often
evaluated in comparison to prior years. In Butler v. Commissioner,241 the
court held that "although the record demonstrates that petitioner enjoyed a
high standard of living during 1992 and maintained accounts at various
upscale department stores where she made significant purchases, there is no
evidence in the record indicating whether such expenditures were out of the
ordinary when compared to petitioners' spending habits in prior years."242
On the other hand, unusually lavish expenditures and trips abroad are
evidence of receipt of a significant benefit.2 43
If the requesting spouse receives assets in order to preserve them
from creditors, this is often sufficient evidence that the requesting spouse
would not be unfairly burdened by the tax liability. For example, in Ohrman
238. 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 353, 355, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2010-233 at 1387
(2010).
239. T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-106.
240. See, e.g., Sjodin v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2004-205 at 1248-
49 (2004), vacated and remanded, Sjodin v. Commissioner, 2006-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 1 50,357, 97 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2006-2622 (8th Cir. 2006)
241. 114 T.C. 276, 285 (2000), abrogated, Porter v. Commissioner, 132
T.C. 203 (2009). See also Stolkin v. Commissioner, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 143, 143
T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-211 at 1099-1100 (2008)
242. Id
243. See, e.g., Alt, 101 Fed. Appx. at 43; Doyle v. Commissioner, 94 Fed.
Appx. 949, 953 (3d Cir. 2004).
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v. Commissioner,244 a couple was legally separated but remained living
together. The husband had transferred more than $782,000 in property to his
wife one week after the IRS sent the couple a letter stating their tax
deficiency. Under the separation agreement, the husband retained only his
personal belongings. The court concluded:
[P]etitioner's use of State family law as a vehicle to lend
legitimacy to Mr. Ohrman's transfer of assets and income to
her is the type of abuse that Congress expressly intended to
stop by adding paragraph (4) to section 6015(c). While the
State of Oregon's equitable distribution rules provided the
mechanism for the transfer of Mr. Ohrman's assets and
income to petitioner, they do not negate the principal
purpose for which the transfer occurred, the avoidance of
tax.
On this basis, the court denied the wife innocent spouse relief so that the
innocent spouse rules would not protect family property.
When the requesting spouse was not the transferee, not all transfers
246failed to protect assets from the IRS. In Wiener v. Commissioner, two or
three months after the IRS assessed the joint tax liability, the husband
transferred the family home to a trust established by his father. The court
held:
Although we understand respondent's concern about the
timing of the transfer, we reject respondent's implied
argument that the transfer was a transfer between spouses as
part of a fraudulent scheme by such spouses within the
meaning of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01(5). The transfer
was not between petitioner and Mr. Wiener; it was between
petitioner and the Charles Wiener Trust.247
The wife was therefore granted innocent spouse relief, even though she and
her husband continued to reside in the home. On the other hand, in Andrews
244. 86 T.C.M. (CCH) at 504, T.C.M. (RIA) at 1666 (2003). See also
Doyle v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1108, 1111-12, T.C.M. (RIA) $ 2003-96
at 468-69 (2003), aff'd, Doyle v. Commissioner, 94 Fed. Appx. 949 (3d Cir. 2004);
Pierce, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1561, T.C.M. (RIA) at 1009. But see United States v.
Evans, 513 F. Supp. 2d 825 (W.D. Tex. 2007), corrected on reconsideration, United
States v. Evans, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-6811 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
245. Ohrman, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) at 505, T.C.M. (RIA) at 1668.
246. 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 227, 234, T.C.M. (RIA) 2008-230 at 1230 (2008).
247. Id.
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v. United States,248 a woman transferred substantially all of her assets to her
son when she realized there was tax liability due and her suit to quiet title to
her home failed. Considering the requesting spouse's unclean hands, the
court noted in that Wiener the non-requesting spouse transferred the
property; in Andrews, the requesting spouse was the transferor.
When determining whether a requesting spouse enjoyed a significant
benefit from the tax deficiency, courts often ignore the fungibility of money.
Instead, courts are likely to find a significant benefit if the government can
trace money owed the government to specific expenditures. In Argyle v.
Commissioner,249 the IRS traced the nonpayment of tax to the purchase of a
new car, and the court agreed that this was a significant benefit. Receiving
money on divorce if traceable to the deficiency, even if the marriage was
abusive, has been held to be a sufficiently significant benefit.250 On the other
hand, in Jones v. US.,251 the court held that although there remained some
assets that were acquired during the marriage, none were traceable to the
understated income and, therefore, the wife did not significantly benefit.
In addition, courts rarely look at what would have happened if the
taxes had been paid. In Billing v. Commissioner,252 in which a husband
sought relief, the court held that it was not a significant benefit to the
husband that the couple was able to continue their free-spending lifestyle and
afford to purchase a larger house because the wife had spent most of the
embezzled money on herself. The court did not consider whether the couple
could have afforded the lifestyle or the larger house if the wife had been
required to fund her own spending from non-embezzled funds.
Applying a mathematical analysis to determine whether the
requesting spouse significantly benefited is also unsatisfying as neither
Congress nor the Treasury Department has provided a numerical amount that
constitutes a significant benefit. Nevertheless, in Haltom v. Commissioner,253
the court applied such an approach. It concluded that of the $275,000 that the
husband, as the non-requesting spouse, contributed to family finances from
1990 to 1992, $230,000 benefited the requesting spouse - only $25,000
more than the income they reported. Because this was less than 15 percent of
the couple's adjusted gross income, the requesting spouse was held not to
248. 69 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974 (N.D. Ohio 1999), affd, Andrews v. Taylor,
225 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2000).
249. T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-129.
250. Estate of Gurr, T.C. Summ. Op. 2002-7.
251. 322 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (D.N.D. 2004).
252. 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 183, 187, T.C.M. (RIA) 2007-234 at 1427 (2007).
See also Beatty v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1422, 1427, T.C.M. (RIA)
2007-167 at 1123 (2007). But see George v. Commissioner, supra note 234.
253. T.C.M. (RIA) T 2005-209 at 1597.
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have significantly benefited and, therefore, the burden was unfairly imposed
on her.
2. Crushing Burden
a. Economic Hardship
In 1998, members of Congress referred to the "financial and
emotional distress" imposed on innocent spouses by unrelieved tax
burdens. 254 Although Congress had been concerned about innocent spouses'
economic hardship, after the enactment of section 6015 the IRS was deluged
with many claims for relief by divorced or separated spouses before the IRS
had noticed anything wrong with the couples' returns. 55 In 2000, Congress
responded by enacting a rohibition on filing claims for relief until a
deficiency was asserted. 25 Therefore, a requesting spouse must now be
assessed, and therefore suffer a tax deficiency, before he or she can seek
relief under section 6015(c). This is consistent with the original
congressional desire that the tax burden to be relieved should impose true
hardship on the requesting spouse.
In its interpretation of the statute, the IRS incorporated this
congressional objective as one equitable factor for purposes of sections
6015(b) and (f). For this purpose, the IRS defines economic hardship as
the inability to pay reasonable basic living expenses.258 Determining whether
a requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship requires a facts and
circumstances test that looks at each requesting spouse's unique
circumstances.259 These circumstances include the requesting spouse's age;
employment status and ability to earn; number of dependents; the amount
reasonably necessary for food, clothing, and housing; the cost of living for
254. 144 CONG. REC. S1073 (1998) (statement of Sen. Bob Graham). See
also notes 58-68.
255. Robert Steinberg, Three at Bats Against Joint and Several Tax
Liability: (1) Innocent Spouse (2) The Election to Limit Liability And (3) Equitable
Relief: The Treasury and Courts Begin to Interpret IRC 6015 After Enactment of the
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 403,
407 (2001) [Hereinafter Steinberg, Three at Bats]; Ryan Donmoyor, ABA Tax
Section Meeting: Divorce Lawyers, Tax Lawyers Split on Election of Proportionate
Liability, 98 TNT 149-2 (August 4, 1998) [hereinafter Donmoyor, Divorce Lawyers].
256. Consolidated Appropriations Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Appx. G,§ 313, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A640-43 (2000). For debates regarding the value of the
protective elections see Donmoyer, Divorce Lawyers, supra note 255; Steinberg,
Three at Bats, supra note 255, at 407.
257. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298
258. This definition is made by reference to Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4).
259. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4).
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the geographic area; and any extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, when
one critic of the current innocent spouse relief stated that failing to find
economic hardship is "in essence determining that she would have no trouble
paying the tax," that is not the measure of economic hardship.260
The issue of economic hardship was raised in 187 of the section
6015 cases, but of the seventy-two cases granting relief at least in part on
equitable 2rounds, 22.2 percent, the court did not mention economic
hardship. However, as shown in the following chart, when judges found
economic hardship, it was a strong factor in favor of relief.
ECONOMIC HARDSHIP
Requesting Not Neutral
Not IRS spouse enough or no
Found find conceded conceded evidence conclusion
Number of cases 40 42 5 9 85 6
Percentage of
cases 21.4% 22.5% 2.7% 4.8% 45.5% 3.2%
Number of win 37 7 3 2 11 2
Winning
percentage 92.5% 16.7% 60.0% 22.2% 12.9% 1 33.3%
In order for a requesting spouse to establish that imposition of
liability would create an economic hardship, evidence of the requesting
spouse's financial situation must be presented. In 44.9 percent of the cases
raising the issue of economic hardship, the court noted that the requesting
spouse did not offer sufficient evidence to support a claim of hardship. It was
insufficient when one requesting spouse argued, "It is simply baffling that
respondent cannot determine for itself that petitioner would suffer economic
hardship if relief from joint and several liability is not granted when it was
garnishing $557.45 from her paychecks leaving her a paltry $356.55 for two
(2) weeks take home pay." 262 Similarly, hardship was not established when a
wife claimed that if all of her assets were liquidated and paid towards the
assessment, the couple would still owe more than $1 million in taxes or when
another wife argued that the economic hardship factor was "discriminatory
and unconstitutional." 263
260. Schumacher, Administrative Process, supra note 98; Commissioner v.
Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1278 (2009); Alt, 101 Fed. Appx. at 44.
261. Although more cases defined economic hardship under section 6015(f)
than under section 6015(b), there was no meaningful difference in the interpretation
of the factor if the case was won under one or the other.
262. Ware v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1196, 1198, T.C.M. (RIA)
2007-112 at 789 (2007).
263. Chou v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1152, 1158, T.C.M. (RIA)
2007-102 at 732 (2007); Demirjian v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 841, 844,
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There is, however, no more definitive rule defining economic
hardship than that provided by the regulations. The National Taxpayer
Advocate reported that 65 percent of those requesting relief make less than
$30,000 per year.264 That information is unconfirmed by the opinions.
However, some amount of annual earnings might make it impossible to be
too heavily burdened. In Feldman v. Commissioner,265 the court found that
an attorney earning $130,000 per year was "totally dissimilar from other
requesting spouses, who were living at or near poverty level at the time of
their request." 266 In Schepers v. Commissioner,267 the requesting spouse
complained that he would be required to work until he was seventy-five to
pay off the liability. The court dismissed this concern, finding that collection
would likely be confined to the ten-year collection period and the requesting
spouse would therefore not suffer unduly.
The relative inconsistency of the application of the Treasury
Department's standard is illustrated by a comparison of Rice v.
Commissioner268 and Stephenson v. Commissioner.269 In Rice, the Court
argued that the wife appeared "to have the ability to work more than 20
hours a week and to earn more income," and she was not granted relief.270
On the other hand, in Stephenson, the wife was held to face economic
hardship although she had quit three jobs. Although one can imagine how
these cases could be reconciled, the court did not undertake that informative
step that would aid the IRS in future applications of the factor.
To measure whether an unmitigated tax burden would be crushing to
the requesting spouse (or cause economic hardship), courts generally require
specific information regarding the requesting spouse's expenses and income,
although these amounts do not always have to be substantiated.271
T.C.M. (RIA) T 2004-22 at 113 (2004). But see Korchack v. Commissioner, 92
T.C.M. (CCH) 199, 217, T.C.M. (RIA) 2006-185 at 1283 (2006).
264. NTA, 2005 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 328.
265. 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 50, 52, T.C.M. (RIA) 2003-201 at 1092 (2003).
266. id.
267. 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1343, 1344, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2010-80 at 500 (2010).
268. T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-69.
269. 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1048, 1050, T.C.M. (RIA) 2011-16 at 70 (2011).
270. T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-69.
271. See, e.g., Drayer v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 465, 467-68,
T.C.M. (RIA) T 2010-257 at 1550 (2010); Kosola v. Commissioner. 99 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1141, 1145, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-34 at 211 (2010). Although the 1984
version of relief included a new spouse's income when determining whether a
requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship, the provision was omitted in
1998. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(D) (repealed in 1998). In Farmer v. Commissioner, the
court held that even though a wife had remarried, there was economic hardship
because the wife could not support herself out of her own assets. 93 T.C.M. (CCH)
1052, 1054, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2007-74 at 581 (2007). Similarly, the court would not
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Nevertheless, sufficient proof often requires significant disclosure of
personal information. When a requesting wife refused to answer questions
about her residence or other assets, it was deemed impossible for her to
suffer an economic hardship.272 On the other hand, in one case where abuse
was alleged, the court held that when a wife said she did not have the
requisite information regarding economic hardship because she did not want
to ask her husband, the IRS had an obligation to probe further.273
Despite the facts and circumstances nature of economic hardship,
some generalizations can be drawn from the cases regarding what is required
to meet this factor for relief. First, the test is personal to the requesting
spouse and cannot be claimed by a requesting spouse's estate.274 On the
other hand, the liability need not create economic hardship, a requesting
spouse may win relief if the spouse would be in hardship regardless of the
liability; however, simply living in a precarious financial situation is
insufficient.275 Similarly, a contingent future hardship, even if caused by loss
of a job at the IRS, is insufficient to establish an economic hardship as is a
difficulty in liquidating one's assets.2 In Motsko v. Commissioner, even
though a requesting husband could not use his assets because they were tied
up in divorce proceedings, "that does not render them valueless" and they
were used to negate economic hardship.278
Declaration of bankruptcy is one possible indicator of economic
hardship.
allow the IRS to presume that a requesting spouse's children would continue paying
her expenses. Ferrarese v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 400, 402, T.C.M. (RIA)
2002-249 at 1542-43 (2002).
272. D'Aunay v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1134, 1136-37, T.C.M.
(RIA) 2004-79 at 495-96 (2004).
273. Nihiser v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531, 1532, T.C.M. (RIA)
2008-135 at 744 (2008).
274. See Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106 (2002), abrogated, Porter
v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203 (2009).
275. Beatty, 93 T.C. Memo. (CCH) at 1426, T.C. Memo. (RIA) at 1121;
Gilliam v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2004-37.
276. Smith v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 349, 352, T.C.M. (RIA)
2009-237 at 1761 (2009); Kalinowski v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1081,
1086, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2001-21 at 173 (2001).
277. 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 711, 714, T.C.M. (RIA) 12006-17 at 103 (2006).
278. Id.
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BANKRUPTCY FILING
Husband Wife Wife
claimed Husband Winning claimed won Winning
relief won relief percentage relief relief percentage
Husband
filed 6 1 16.7% 19 9 47.4%
Wife filed 2 0 0.0% 11 7 63.6%
Couple
filed 3 1 33.3% 30 13 43.3%
Each filed 0 0 0.0% 2 0 0.0%
In 42.5 percent of cases, one of the spouses or former spouses had declared
bankruptcy, but there was no consistent finding of economic hardship (or
significant benefit) in cases mentioning bankruptcy. However, there does
appear to be a gender component as wives who claimed relief, whether they
or their husbands filed for bankruptcy, did significantly better than when
husbands claimed relief and there was a bankruptcy filing.
Prior grants of section 6015 relief should help alleviate economic
hardship. In forty-three section 6015 cases, the requesting spouse had
previously been granted some amount of section 6015 relief. Nevertheless, in
37.2 percent, thus slightly more than the average success rate of innocent
spouse cases, the requesting spouse won further relief.
Thus, some judges use consideration of economic hardship when
determining the equity of granting relief, but when they do so they are
defining their own individual sense of when a tax burden will be crushing.
For some judges, that there were other avenues for relief for the requesting
spouse was sufficient to deny a finding of economic hardship, regardless of
whether a requesting spouse wanted to pursue those options. For example, in
Rogers v. Commissioner,279 a husband did not receive relief in the Tax
Court, which noted that he was also seeking relief in the family court. In
Martinez v. Commissioner,280 the court noted the wife's situation was
"highly sympathetic and credible"; however, "if petitioner is truly suffering
from economic hardship, or is unable to pay the debt, then she may want to
approach the IRS with a request for relief under a different principle, such as
an offer-in-compromise or other collection alternative. .2
b. Not Borne by Others
In 1998, Representative Nancy Johnson, chairwoman of the House
Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee, said before the hearings, "Where
279. T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-13. See also Schwind v. Commissioner, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2008-119; Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-39.
280. T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-165.
281. Id.
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one spouse has fulfilled their full obligation as a wage-earning, tax-paying
American, they can be assured they can get complete relief, and we, the rest
of the public, will struggle with their non-performing spouse."282 Thus, at
least some in Congress were willing to relieve the requesting spouse of a tax
burden with the understanding that the revenue might never be collected. The
Treasury Department resisted Johnson's approach because it would put the
federal government in a less favorable position than other creditors who
retained joint and several liability.283 It remains to be examined whether
judges, recognizing the economic burden potentially placed on requesting
spouses, are influenced by the amount of government revenue that might be
lost.
The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found that
for fiscal year 2004, 6,555 requesting spouses were granted relief in the
amount of $117.6 million and 10,439 were denied relief of $260.8 million.284
These numbers cannot be confirmed from the sample because not all section
6015 cases report the amount of taxes that may be relieved. Of the 444 cases,
it is possible to discern the amount of the tax obligation involved in 352
cases, or 79.1 percent, but it is not always clear if these sums include interest,
penalties, or prior payments.
AMOUNT OF LIABILITY
$10,000- $50,001- $100,001- >$1
< $10,000 $50,000 $100,000 $1 million million
Number of
cases 113 102 34 74 29
Number won 40 38 9 26 4
Winning
percentage 35.4% 37.3% 26.5% 35.1% 13.8%
Of the opinions that include reference to how much tax revenue is involved,
32.1 percent of the cases involved amounts less than $10,000 and 61.1
percent involved less than $50,000. Only 8.2 percent of these opinions
involved claims with tax bills of over $1 million, and only 13.8 percent of
requesting spouses were able to win these high-value cases. Of all of the
cases referencing this factor that were won by the requesting spouse, 74.4
percent involved less than $100,000 in taxes.
That a large percentage of cases involve relatively smaller sums is
surprising because the IRS's methods for prioritizing collection focus on the
aggregate amount of taxes owed, so that smaller revenue amounts get less
282. Oversight Subcommittee, supra note 55, at 32.
283. Id.
284. TIGTA, ACCURATE RELIEF DETERMINATIONS, supra note 97, at 7-8.
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attention until interest and penalties accrue.285 Smaller amounts should
therefore be a smaller percentage of deficiencies asserted. Nonetheless,
innocent spouse relief may be one of the ways these lower-income taxpayers
have to contest collection. In Cummings v. Commissioner,286 a divorced
woman working two jobs was granted relief from a $506 liability that
originated in her husband's self-employment. She was granted relief based
on her economic hardship and the fact that she did not receive a significant
benefit from the nonpayment. However, smaller revenue amounts are no
guarantee of relief. In Freulich v. Commissioner,287 a widow had income
from gambling that generated $606 in taxes. The Tax Court would not grant
her relief because the gambling was her income. In yet another case, that
$2,300 of taxes owed seemed small in comparison to the requesting wife's
annual income of $46,000 was enough for the court to discount economic
hardship.288
As with small revenue claims, it is hard to define what will win a
large revenue case. In Chou v. Commissioner,289 the couple was fighting the
assessment of tax because, if placed in the earlier year as the IRS claimed,
the couple would owe almost $2 million more in alternative minimum tax
because of the exercise of stock options that quickly declined in value. The
couple lost. Unlike in Chou, in Barranco v. Commissioner290 and Pierce v.
Commissioner,291 the couples enjoyed extravagant lifestyles and blatantly
abused the tax system. In those cases the couples also lost. For the three
cases with more than $1 million of tax liability owed which were won on the
merits, all involved requesting wives, none of the wives were found to have
knowledge of the deficiency, two arose from investments in tax shelters, two
wives had PhDs and one had a masters degree, and in two cases the husband
handled the family's finances but in the other the wife handled them.
Except for very large revenue cases, the amount of the liability does
not appear to affect the outcome of the case. Similarly, whether the non-
requesting spouse would be able or unable to ay the taxes owed was raised
in only ninety-seven section 6015 opinions. 29 Therefore, in 78.2 percent of
all section 6015 cases, no mention was made of the ability to recover from
285. Olson Testifies on Fairness in IRS Enforcement, 2007 TNT 44-28
(Mar. 5, 2007).
286. T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-77.
287. T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-124.
288. Meadows v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-42.
289. 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1152, 1156 T.C.M. (RIA) T 2007-102 at 730 (2007).
290. 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 778, 785, T.C.M. (RIA) 2003-18 at 70-71 (2003).
291. 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1553, 1560, T.C.M. (RIA) 2003-188 at 1008
(2003).
292. In 57% of the cases in which reference was made to the other spouse,
the non-requesting spouse was deceased.
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the non-requesting spouse. Of those ninety-seven cases, only seven stated or
implied that the non-requesting spouse could pay the tax. In 43.3 percent of
the cases in which the court mentioned that the non-requesting spouse was in
no financial position to pay the taxes owed, the requesting spouse
nevertheless won relief, above the average success rate. Therefore, judges do
not seem particularly concerned about the government losing revenue.
In some cases, requesting spouses have been relieved of liability not
only for taxes attributable to the non-requesting spouse but also for liability
on their own earnings or for refunds they have received.293 For example, in
Gilbert v. Commissioner,294 a husband was granted section 6015(f) relief
from a tax liability attributable to his own earnings because his wife handled
the family's financial affairs and the court found that he had no reason to
know that she would not pay the taxes owed. In Yakubik v. Commissioner,295
a husband was granted relief when he did not know of his wife's embezzled
funds. The underreporting of income allowed the couple to claim the earned
income tax credit, and relief meant that he was not required to pay back the
refund they had received. The amount of refund was larger in Campbell v.
Commissioner,296 in which a wife was relieved of liability after her husband
settled a $2.8 million liability for $100,000. The couple had received a
$314,000 refund that did not have to be repaid.
3. Summary
Although Congress was concerned about the IRS unfairly imposing a
crushing tax burden on innocent spouses, courts are concerned with only
certain features of that burden. Judges are not particularly concerned about
the circumstances surrounding the application for innocent spouse relief.
Neither what motivated the requesting spouse, the tax issues involved, or (at
least for all but the largest tax obligations) the amount of revenue at stake
appear to significantly affect how judges rule. There might be some
indicators favoring relief, such as the existence of disallowed deductions or
unpaid taxes both having a slightly higher than average success rate, and
judges are possibly suspicious when a requesting spouse is self-employed,
but these factors are not dominant.
Judges care more strongly about the amount of knowledge the
requesting spouse possessed of the deficiency and whether the requesting
spouse benefited from it. However, both knowledge of the liability and
293. But see Freulich, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-124.
294. T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-16.
295. T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-74.
296. 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 735, 737, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2006-24 at 138 (2006).
The house was also in the requesting spouse's name and the husband's situation had
since improved.
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whether a requesting spouse benefited are vaguely defined. Despite the
regulations, courts have yet to establish a generally applicable rule to define
these factors. What seems extravagant or crushing to one judge might not to
another. Thus, judges impose their own interpretation of congressional intent
without producing judicial guidelines for what that intent means in practice.
D. Characteristics ofNon-Requesting Spouse
Congress's 1998 debates regarding innocent spouse relief depicted
the "other" spouse as saddling the innocent spouse with unfair and crushing
tax burdens. This section evaluates whether the non-requesting spouses of
those granted relief by the courts should be characterized as such based on
the available evidence.
1. Abusive
As described in the prior Part, consequences differ significantly if a
court finds a requesting spouse signed a return under abuse as opposed to
duress.298 If a spouse signs a return under duress, there is no joint return.299
Originally, if a spouse signed as a result of abuse not amounting to duress
there was no relief. Despite current attention directed to the problem of
domestic violence, little attention was given to it in 1998, but for an
amendment late in the legislative process that recognized the problem. 300
The IRS subsequently issued guidance providing that if a requesting spouse
297. See notes 58-68. There is nothing to prevent both spouses from
seeking innocent spouse relief and allocating liability between them. This was not
mentioned in congressional debates.
298. This section does not make any statement about what should constitute
abuse or which spouses were actually abused. The former is beyond the scope of this
article and the latter determination is too fact specific to be made from the evidence
available in the opinions. For more on domestic violence, see Deborah M.
Weissman, The Personal is Political - and Economic: Rethinking Domestic
Violence, 2007 BYU L. REv. 387 (2007); Michelle Madden Dempsey, What Counts
as Domestic Violence: A Conceptual Analysis, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301
(2006); Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence:
Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEx ROLES 743 (2005); Emily J. Sack,
Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence
Policy, 2004 WiS. L. REv. 1658 (2004).
299. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297.
300. 144 CONG. REc. S4468, S4500 (1998) (statements of various
Senators); Kerns, Duress, supra note 20; Gary M. Fleischman & Jeffrey J. Bryant, A
Critique of the Innocent Spouse Equitable ReliefProvisions, 90 TNT 1716 (Mar. 19,
2001); Sheryl Stratton & Emily Field, Innocent Spouse Issues Plague Practitioners,
IRS, and Courts, 2000 TAx NOTES 115-4 (June 14, 2000).
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can prove to have been abused, the spouse has a stronger case for equitable
relief under section 6015(b) and (f) and can overcome actual knowledge of
the deficiency under section 6015(c). Nevertheless, for the equitable test as
applied in these cases abuse was only one factor among many, and it is not
intended be given more weight than other factors. 301
Neither the statute nor the regulations define abuse. Some critics
claim that because there is no clear standard defining abuse, it is too hard for
requesting spouses to prove. While the recent Notice defines abuse broadly,
prior to its publication National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson denounced
the IRS in 2011 for denying an abused woman relief.302 In her opinion, IRS
employees who handle these cases demonstrate an unconscionable lack of
knowledge about domestic violence.303 The case at issue was Stephenson v.
Commissioner,30 in which the IRS granted an ex-wife relief for one year but
not for another, focusing on her lack of economic hardship, her receipt of a
significant benefit from the unpaid tax, and her knowledge of the deficiency.
The court overturned the IRS and extended relief for both years. The court
opined that "the verbal abuse turned into physical abuse, and Mr. Stephenson
began throwing items at petitioner when he became angry .... If petitioner
asked what she was signing, Mr. Stephenson made threats of violence or told
her she was not intelligent enough to understand. 305 In the court's and
the Taxpayer Advocate's opinion, the abuse was sufficient to outweigh the
other factors and establish equitable relief.
The following charts document the number of cases referencing
abuse and the number of cases over time. The latter chart looks only at
whether the judge found or dismissed the claim of abuse.
301. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298. Arguing that denying relief
"effectively reject[s] our allegations of abuse" implicitly suggests that abuse be made
a trumping factor, which is not what Congress intended. Schumacher, Administrative
Process, supra note 98. The lack of abuse is not meant to weigh against relief,
although the IRS has argued unsuccessfully that lack of abuse should weigh against
a requesting spouse. See Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137 (2003). Abuse
and financial control by the nonrequesting spouse has been given greater weight for
finding relief for pusposes of section 6015(f). Notice 2012-8, § 4.03(2)(c)(ii), (iv),
supra note 9.
302. Fred Stokeld, Taxpayer Advocate Blasts IRS's Handling of Innocent
Spouse Case, 2011 TAX NOTES 16-9 (Jan. 25, 2011); Notice 2012-8, § 4.03(2)(c)(iv),
supra note 9.
303. Id.
304. 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1048, 1049 T.C.M. (RIA) $ 2011-16 at 69 (2011).
305.Id
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CLAIMS OF ABUSE
Requesting Spouse Claims Abuse
Judge Judge Judge
notes no Total abuse dismisses abuse upholds
abuse claims claims abuse claims
Number of cases 93 56 34 22
Taxpayer wins 25 21 5 16
FINDINGS OF ABUSE OVER TIME
-+-Judge notes no
abuse
-U-Total claims of
abuse
From the data, judges are cognizant of abuse claims. In 149 cases, courts
mentioned abuse and in 62.4 percent of those courts mentioned abuse only to
state that it was not alleged in the case. It is also not true that "[t]here are
few, if any, decided cases in which abuse was present and the court denied
innocent spouse relief."306 In twelve cases there was at least a mention of
abuse but it was unclear from the opinion whether the court concluded that
there was abuse for purposes of its section 6015 analysis. In 60.7 percent of
the cases in which abuse was alleged, the judge found that there was no
abuse, but in 14.7 percent of those cases the requesting spouse was,
nonetheless, granted relief. In 27.3 percent of the cases in which the judge
found that there was abuse, the judge did not grant relief.
One reason judges give for being hesitant to find abuse, particularly
mental or emotional abuse, is that a claim of abuse can itself be abused. "We
are aware of the danger that requesting spouses, in trying to escape financial
liability, may easily exaggerate the level of nonphysical abuse. Innocent-
306. NADLER, INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF, supra note 20, at 40.
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
IVN
XZW 7 A
6952012]
S , N 6%, 65 s s1b '10 so. 10,
HeinOnline  -- 12 Fla. Tax Rev. 695 2012
Florida Tax Review
spouse cases often spring from the dissolution of troubled marriages, and
there is an obvious incentive to vilify the nonrequesting spouse."307 In all the
cases where abuse was alleged, all but two involved divorced, separated, or
widowed spouses.
It is difficult to decipher from the cases what claim or level of abuse
is sufficient to outweigh other considerations weighing against relief. Details
of abuse are necessary and police involvement preferable, although rarely do
the opinions note a significant amount of detail regarding the abuse. In Knorr
V. Commissioner,308 the court did not find abuse when the requesting spouse
provided only generalized claims of abuse. In Collier v. Commissioner the
court noted the need for specific details with independent corroboration. On
the other hand, in Fox v. Commissioner,310 the court weighed abuse as a
positive factor for relief where a police report corroborated the requesting
spouse's claim of assault.
Despite courts' hesitancy to find abuse, in Nihiser v.
Commissioner,311 the Tax Court ruled that abuse is not limited to physical
abuse and may include verbal and mental abuse. What qualifies as verbal or
mental abuse is unclear, although a threat of a voodoo hex will not meet this
criteria.312 Similarly, financial irresponsibility, alleged brainwashing, or
313destroying someone's credit alone does not amount to abuse. In twenty-
five cases, requesting spouses claimed to have been the subject of mental or
emotional abuse but not physical abuse; the requesting spouse won 32
percent of these cases. However, in only four of them did the court find that
there was abuse.
There appears to be a gendered component to judges finding abuse,
although the sample is small. Once a judge finds abuse, husbands fare better
than wives.
307. Nihiser, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1536, T.C.M. (RIA) at 750.
308. T.C.M. (RIA) T 2004-212 at 1324 (2004).
309. 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1799, 1809, T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-144 at 908
(2002).
310. 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 731, 734, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2006-22 at 132 (2006).
311. 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531, 1536, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2008-135 at 751
(2008).
312. Gilmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-132.
313. Pugsley v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 454, 458, T.C.M. (RIA)
2010-255 at 1535 (2010); Stolkin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 145, T.C.M. (RIA) at 1102-
03; Pierce, T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-126; Bames v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA)
2004-266 at 1624 (2004).
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For example, in Schultz v. Commissioner314 and Gilmer v. Commissioner,315
husbands claimed to have been abused. In the former, despite a finding of
abuse, the husband was denied relief because the income was attributable to
him and "he does not claim that he would have challenged the treatment of
any items on the returns."316 In the latter, the judge did not find abuse a
factor favoring relief because the requesting spouse did not corroborate his
claim. Not highlighted in the above chart, both spouses claimed abuse in five
cases and, in these cases, judges concluded there was no abuse or, if there
was abuse, it did not impact their decision.
In some cases, judges needed to be convinced that the requesting
spouse signed the return only because of the abuse. In Wiksell v.
Commissioner,317 the Tax Court agreed that the husband had dragged the
wife out of bed and threw her against the wall, that he had held her hair and
slammed her head against the wall in front of her children, and that he had
consistently intimidated her and the children and belittled and tormented
them. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, repeating the Tax Court's
earlier findings denying relief: "We are simply not convinced that Carpender
would not have signed the two returns only because of demands by David. . .
. [Specifically, she] failed to establish a nexus between spousal abuse
generally and duress in specific instances, the specific instances in this case
being Carpender's signing of these two tax returns." 318 Reliance on an expert
alone might be insufficient for this objective, although practitioners expect
that it would facilitate relief.319 In Wiksell, as in only one other abuse case,
314. 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 353, 354, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-233 at 1385
(2010).
315. T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-132.
316. The husband was granted relief for the portion of the income
attributable to his wife. 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 354, T.C.M. (RIA) at 1386.
317. Wiksell, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2367, T.C.M. (RIA) at 94-485.
318. Wiksell v. Commissioner, 215 F.3d 1335, *3 (9th Cir. 2000), aJ'g,
Wiksell v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1336, T.C.M. (RIA) 199,032 (1999).
319. Michael Schlesinger, Obtaining Innocent Spouse Relief in the Face of
the Service's Propensity to Litigate, 109 J. TAX'N 102, 107 (2008).
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the court made mention of the requesting spouse's expert testimony. 320In
these cases the court was not persuaded because the content of the expert's
testimony was found insufficient to prove abuse.
Procedurally, abuse in cases when there is a claim for innocent
spouse relief raises other concerns that are beyond the scope of this article,
but which are likely to decrease the number of appeals to the courts.
Congress requires that the IRS contact the non-requesting spouse when it
receives an application for innocent spouse relief.321 No exceptions are
granted, even for victims of domestic violence.322 During its internal review,
the IRS does not disclose personal information that does not relate to the
determination of relief. However, if the requesting spouse appeals to the
courts, personal information, such as an address, might be disclosed unless a
protective order has been issued.323 This issue was not raised in any of the
cases in this sample.324
2. Legally Obligated Under State Law
In 1998, much of the discussion in Congress focused on divorced
spouses and extending relief to these individuals. 25 Courts had disallowed
taxpayer arguments that for a divorce court to require a spouse to sign a joint
return amounted to duress.326 The executive branch similarly did not share
320. 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2367-68, T.C.M. (RIA) at 94-486; Collier v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1799, 1809, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2002-144 at 908
(2002).
321. I.R.C. § 6015(h)(2); Reg. § 1.6015-6.
322. The IRS suggests that a spouse who fears abuse write "Potential
Domestic Abuse Case" at the top of Form 8857. See Steinberg, Three at Bats, supra
note 255, at 412.
323. R. Prac. & P. U.S. Tax Ct. 325; OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, C.C.N.
CC-2005-0 11, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING LITIGATION OF SECTION
6015 CASES IN TAX COURT 3-4 (2005). The Tax Court is required to disclose
information and provide an opportunity for intervention. I.R.C. § 6015(e)(4).
324. Cases might not have arisen on this issue because of the chilling effect
on abused spouses of potential disclosure to abusers.
325. All references in the Senate Finance Committee hearing were to
couples whose marriages had come to an end. Finance Committee, supra note 58, at
148. In the House's hearings, Representative Johnson urged the IRS follow divorce
decrees and was "extremely disappointed" that the IRS was not more receptive to the
proposal. Oversight Subcommittee, supra note 55, at 20.
326. Steve R. Johnson, The Duress or Deception Defense to Joint and
Several Liability, 6 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 15 (2004); Price v. Commissioner, 86
T.C.M. (CCH) 203, 204, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2003-226 at 1276 (2003); Berger v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2160, 2172, T.C.M. (RIA) 1 96,076 at 96-628
(1996).
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Congress's concern,327 although the IRS later made marital status a factor for
determining whether a requesting spouse should be entitled to equitable
relief.328 When asked to consider following divorce decrees' allocations of
liability, the Treasury Department worried that the IRS is not a party to
divorce proceedings and that there is nothing in a divorce proceeding to
protect the government's interests.329 To allow divorce or separation
agreements to allocate liability for federal tax purposes in a way inapplicable
to other creditors would allow state law to trump federal revenue
collection.330 Some couples proved eager to do so. 331 Thus, there was tension
between Congress and the executive as to the weight to be given to private
agreements.
Under pre-1998 law, the Tax Court repeatedly ruled that tax
allocation agreements between spouses and former spouses were not binding
on the federal courts, but federal courts no longer apply this rule
consistently.332 For example, one court dismissed the significance of the
couple's divorce decree, proclaiming in a case otherwise requiring a
balancing of factors, "We need not discuss petitioner's claim regarding the
judgment for dissolution of marriage because such a claim is a State
matter."333 On the other hand, finding the apportionment of liability weighed
heavily in favor of relief under section 6015, another court ruled, "The most
important factor in this case is intervenor's legal obligation under the North
Carolina court's order to either directly pay the 1998 Federal tax liability or
indemnify petitioner for his payment thereof."334
Although 255 of the couples in which a spouse requested relief, or
59.6 percent, were divorced or divorcing by the time of the trial, only 243
327. See REPORT ON JOINT LIABILITY, supra note 13, at 43.
328. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298.
329. See REPORT ON JOINT LIABILITY, supra note 13, at 43. Because the
rights of other creditors remain, following state divorce decrees shifts collections
from the federal government to other creditors and often does little to help the
requesting spouse. Id. at 41-44.
330. Oversight Subcommittee, supra note 55, at 20 (statements of Donald
Lubick and Linda Willis); REPORT ON JOINT LIABILITY, supra note 13, at 28-9.
331. See, e.g., Acoba v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-64.
332. Pesch v. Commissionerr, 78 T.C. 100, 129 (1982); Bruner v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 534, 537 (1962); Neeman v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 397,
399 (1949), affd per curiam 200 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1952); Casey v. Commissioner,
12 T.C. 224, 227 (1949); Ballenger v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 651, 651,
T.C.M. (P-H) 155,171 at 55-544 (1955); Willis, supra note 55, at 2.
333. Glenn v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-127.
334. Gay v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-36. See also Bruen v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 400, 404-05, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-249 at 1834-
36 (2009); Withers v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-73.
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had completed their divorce. Of those, only 103 opinions mentioned an
allocation between spouses of the tax liability.
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION DECREES
Winning
Number of cases Taxpayer won Percentage
Husband made 34 17 50.0%
liable
Wife made liable 3 1 33.3%
Some division of
liability 23 10 43.5%
Jointly liable 9 3 33.3%
Opinion mentions
no or ambiguous
provision 30 7 23.3%
No mention in
opinion 140 64 45.7%
Other 4 2 50.0%
Fifty-eight of the opinions stated that the couples' divorce decrees allocated
at least a portion of the tax liabilities to a non-requesting spouse. In twenty-
six of those, or 44.8 percent, the court granted relief consistent with the
divorce decree, but none relied solely upon the divorce decree for its
determination.
One reason for reticence to rely on divorce decrees is that courts
share the IRS's concern that couples will use separation and divorce
agreements to take advantage of the tax system.335 In one case a court
worried, "In an effort to avoid paying tax liabilities, married taxpayers ...
could structure future payments so that ownership is attributable to the
spouse requesting relief under section 6015, while continuing a jointly
financed lifestyle."336 In response to this fear, divorce and separation
agreements are given no evidentiary value if the requesting spouse had
reason to know the non-requesting spouse would not fulfill the legal
obligation. 337 In seven of the cases under review, liability was allocated
under a divorce decree but the court found that the other spouse was aware at
the time of the agreement that the obligation would not be paid. The
requesting spouse won none of these cases.
In thirteen of the cases both spouses agreed to share liability or the
requesting spouse agreed to be solely liable. Nonetheless, in 23.1 percent of
those cases, the court granted innocent spouse relief to the liable spouse. For
335. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 297; Oversight Committee,
supra note 55, at 11; REPORT ON JOINT LIABILITY, supra note 13, at 43.
336. Ordlock v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 47, 58 (2006).
337. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, 298.
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example, in Maier v. Commissioner, the IRS allowed relief despite a
divorce agreement providing that the spouses would be jointly liable; the
husband intervened but the court had no jurisdiction to hear his claim. In
instances where courts granted relief despite agreements to the contrary, the
requesting spouse won a better deal than intended by Congress.
Although some critics of innocent spouse relief worry that allowing
divorced couples this second bite at the allocation apple might be turning the
Tax Court into a new divorce court, few cases turned on this issue.
Moreover, few cases invoked a family courts' requirement that spouses sign
a return. In the only case in which the issue came up squarely, Bruen v.
Commissioner,339 the divorce court had ordered amended returns be filed
jointly with each equally responsible. On the returns, the wife wrote "under
protest pursuant to Amended Judgement [sic] following Divorce Nisi" above
her signature but, according to the court, this was to protest being forced to
pay any of the tax liability, not to void the joint return. Filing jointly
decreased the couple's liability by $7,882.
Even when cases are not contingent on what the family court
requires, courts handling tax matters become embroiled in family affairs.
One court complained, "This case arises from a troubled five-year marriage
that produced two children, constant bickering, and numerous mutual
accusations of wrongdoing.... In this case where neither of the main parties
is credible, we piece together the fragments of truth as best we can to decide
whether she is entitled to relief under section 6015." 340 Even if the court
decides to grant innocent spouse relief, a requesting spouse can still be held
jointly liable in divorce court if settlements have not yet been finalized.34 1
In addition to divorce and separation decrees, courts must also
examine other state-imposed obligations and means of relief. Community
property offers the opportunity for relief or additional liability. The statute
provides that section 6015 is to be applied without regard to community
338. 360 F.3d 361, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2004), aff'g, Maier v. Commissioner,
119 T.C. 267 (2002).
339. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 400, 402, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-249 at 1831 (2009).
Weight v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 98, 99, T.C.M. (RIA) T 2003-214 at
1147 (2003), involved a divorce decree-mandated joint return and one issue was
whether the return was timely, but the case was decided on other grounds. In James
v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2004-176, the family court required the couple
file separate returns.
340. Stergios v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1057, 1057, T.C.M.
(RIA) 12009-15 at 81 (2009).
341. See Melvyn B. Frumkes, Equitable Distribution of Tax Liabilities, 20
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 179 (2006). See also Williams v. Commissioner, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2009-19, in which the court reserved power pending the outcome of the
innocent spouse case.
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property law.342 That provides only limited protection as, depending on the
state, separate debts can be satisfied from community property. One
community property advocate urged that spouses not have separate taxes
come out of community property.343 The Treasury Department refused to
follow the suggestion,34 and courts have agreed. Although 157 cases arose
in community property states, only ten hinged on community property laws,
and in all but one the law was interpreted for the benefit of the government.
For example, in United States v. Stolle,345 the District Court held that under
California community property laws, "community property tax is available to
satisfy a debt from either spouse, even if the other spouse is not responsible
for the debt."346
Other state law property rules, such as transferee liability, also
apply.347 However, courts have largely dismissed these obligations to the
advantage of requesting spouses, so that they provide little revenue for the
government.348 In this sample, only two cases involved transferee liability,
and both were resolved to the advantage of the requesting spouse. In Jones v.
United States 349 a couple had claimed substantial losses as a result of
investments in tax shelters that were subsequently disallowed. The District
Court ruled that the statute of limitations for transferee liability, one year
beyond that of the taxpayer, had lapsed. In United States v. Evans,350
transfers by an executrix of her late husband's property to her children were
set aside as fraudulent conveyances; however, her fiduciary liability was
barred by res judicata as a result of an earlier ruling insulating the executrix
herself.
3. Intervening
Without debate, in 1998 non-requesting spouses were granted the
right to participate in the administrative process and to intervene before the
Tax Court in innocent spouse cases, although some academics have since
342. I.R.C. § 6015(a).
343. T.D. 9003, supra note 128.
344. Id. Rev. Rul. 2004-74, 2004-2 C.B. 84, 85-86 sets out a five-step
process for determining how much of an overpayment the IRS may apply against
one spouse's separate tax liability.
345. 2000 US Dist. LEXIS 5454 at *18 (C.D. Cal. March 15, 2000).
346. Id.
347. Reg. § 1.6015-1(j)(1).
348. Christian, Joint and Several Liability, supra note 20, at 592-77; Beck,
Innocent Spouse Problem, supra note 44, at 402-08.
349. 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1026; I.R.C. § 6901(c)(1).
350. 513 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
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questioned the wisdom of allowing husbands to intervene. 3 5 1 More husbands
than wives intervene, as shown in the following chart. In the chart, a win by
the government against the requesting spouse was counted as a win for the
intervening spouse unless the intervening spouse intervened on behalf of the
352
requesting spouse.
INTERVENORS
Intervened Intervened
when on behalf of
Total government requesting Interven
cases conceded spouse or Won
Husband as
intervenor 613 20 4 25
Wife as intervenor 21 2 0 13
In eighty-two of the 444 section 6015 cases, or 18.5 percent, the non-
requesting spouse intervened; 43.6 percent of the time an intervenor opposed
relief, the intervenor won.354 Husbands won 41.0 percent of the time they
intervened while wives won 61.9 percent, in part because husbands were
much more likely (90.9 percent) to intervene when the government conceded
relief to the other spouse. Four husbands (in five cases) intervened on behalf
of a former spouse. Excluding cases where the government conceded relief
or intervention was on behalf of the requesting spouse, husbands won as
intervenors 56.8 percent of the cases.
The number of cases with intervenors is limited because section
6015 does not grant the Tax Court jurisdiction over non-requesting spouses'
petitions to review grants of relief by the IRS unless they are appealed by the
requesting spouse to the courts. Thus, in all cases where the intervenor
sought an appeal, the court denied jurisdiction. However, the IRS cannot
351. I.R.C. § 6015(h)(2), (e)(4); Beck, Failure, supra note 20, at 950. For a
discussion of the rights of intervening (and participating) spouses see Rule 325,
supra note 295. See also Rev. Proc. 2003-19, 2003-1 C.B. 371.
352. In only three cases did the intervening spouse win without a
government victory, and in each of those cases the spouse won the right to intervene.
353. There are three cases for which is it is impossible to confirm if the
intervenor intervened on behalf of or against the requesting spouse; however, in one
the spouses remained married.
354. These results differ from those found by Trexler, Contesting, supra
note 67, who only looks at cases decided on the merits. See text supra page 20.
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settle a case once a requesting spouse files a petition in the Tax Court unless
355
the non-requesting spouse agrees.
The justification given by the courts for denying jurisdiction (in
addition to the lack of statutory authority) is that spouses who file joint
returns are jointly and severally liable for the entire liability.356 Therefore,
intervenors suffer no actual harm when the other spouse is granted relief. For
example, in Maier v. Commissioner,357 when a New York divorce decree
stipulated that both spouses remain liable for all taxes due but the IRS
granted the wife relief, the court held, "To the extent that petitioner believes
that he has suffered an injustice due to a flaw in the controlling statutory
provisions, his recourse may be to seek a legislative remedy."35 8
In twenty-two of the cases involving intervenors, or 26.8 percent, the
IRS had already conceded relief to the requesting spouse by the time of the
trial but the intervenor nonetheless appealed. The intervenor lost every time.
After Villela-Willcox v. Commissioner,359 it is questionable whether an
intervenor can prevail once the government concedes relief, despite the
court's assurance that "[u]nder appropriate circumstances, we would not be
reluctant to deny section 6015(c) relief to a requesting spouse if evidence
offered by an intervenor, rather than the Commissioner, demonstrated that
such relief was unavailable because of the requesting spouse's 'actual
knowledge' of 'the item giving rise to the deficiency."' 3 0 However, in
Villela- Willcox, the court found the intervenor to be the more credible
witness and the "intervenor's evidence shows petitioner's connection and
involvement with intervenor's participation" in the tax shelter at issue.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that although "intervenor's evidence is
persuasive,... it is not so compelling to require that the settlement between
respondent and petitioner be disregarded." 361
4. Summary
Courts generally place less emphasis on the characterization of non-
requesting spouses than did Congress, but the weight given to these factors
355. Corson v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 354, 364-65 (2000). For fiscal year
2010, the non-requesting spouse intervened in ten cases, or 28% of the time. NTA,
2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 500.
356. See Holloway v. Commissioner, 322 Fed. Appx. 421 (6th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1535 (2009); Baranowicz v. Commissioner, 432 F.3d 972
(9th Cir. 2005).
357. 119 T.C. 267, 276, aff'd, Maier, 360 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2004).
358. Id.
359. T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-75.
360. Id.
361. Id.
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might be increasing. For example, courts are increasingly sensitive to the
issue of abuse in claims for innocent spouse relief, although that sensitivity
does not mean that courts often find abuse to be a mitigating factor sufficient
to outweigh other factors weighing against relief. Similarly, courts often
decide cases in a manner consistent with divorce decrees that allocate
liability between former spouses but without overtly relying on those
allocations. On the other hand, courts are not opposed to intervening spouses,
the nefarious husband, unless the IRS concedes relief to the requesting
spouse. Therefore, in courts' evaluation of these factors, consistent with the
current Treasury Department guidance, most appear unwilling to give
perceived negative features of non-requesting spouses greater weight than
other factors that weigh for or against relief.
PART IV. CONCLUSION
After a decade of fighting, Kathleen Alioto won relief from almost
$2 million in taxes. A year earlier, however, another former politician's wife
was not victorious.362 Susan Wilson and her husband, former Arkansas state
senator Nick Wilson, were ordered to return a refund they had received. The
refund stemmed from $373,089 of illegal kickbacks Nick received when
defrauding the federal and state governments and which the couple had
reported on their joint tax returns. Once caught, and as part of his sentencing,
Nick was required to make restitution. After doing so, the Wilsons claimed a
$128,676 refund based on the income they had earlier reported. The
government sent the couple a refund check and then demanded its return.
Susan sought to keep the refund, claiming she was an innocent spouse.
The court did not think the innocent spouse provisions applied in
Susan's case; the provision could not be stretched that far. "That Susan
Wilson was not aware of the criminal activity is not relevant." 363 Although
the court felt little need to discuss the issue in detail, Susan was still married,
had benefited from the refund, and, while her husband might be nefarious,
there was nothing to indicate that he had acted nefariously towards her.
Therefore, Susan did not fit within the congressional model of an innocent
spouse, and she had to repay the refund.
When Congress enacted section 6015 in 1998, the primary concern
was providing relief to those it deemed "innocent" and, although Congress
did not define the term with precision, there was a focus on divorced and
separated wives whose husbands had created crushing tax burdens and then
unfairly left their wives to pay the bill. It was important to Congress that the
362. United States v. Wilson, No. 4:06cv001628, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86900 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 26, 2007); David Firestone, Arkansas Lawmakers Indicted in
Vast Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1999 at A18.
363. Wilson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86900 at *10.
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tax deficiency resulted from an error created by the non-reuesting spouse
and that the requesting spouse not have caused the liability. Congress did
not want innocent spouse relief to become a means by which couples could
avoid their "just" taxes.365 The court did not feel Susan fit this mold.
The Treasury Department, when interpreting the statute, expanded
on this congressional intent, creating a checklist for relief that is often
referenced in judicial decisions. That checklist has recently been revised.
However, a review of the cases demonstrates that courts apply their own
interpretation of congressional intent, only loosely confined by the terms
provided by the executive agency. This result occurs despite the fact that the
Tax Court, in particular, is being deluged with innocent spouse cases and the
court's individualized evaluation requires fact specific examinations that it
might otherwise delegate to the IRS.
Thus, in their evaluations of individual claims, courts are using the
Treasury Department's factors to their own ends as they seek to provide
relief to divorced or separated wives who were unfairly left oppressive tax
burdens by their guilty husbands. Therefore, the gender of the requesting
spouse is somewhat important - marital status is more so. That the tax
burden be a crushing one is important in the eyes of the courts, but the
standard is fuzzily defined. It has been hard for the courts to define clear
limits to economic hardship that can be applied with consistency in the
innocent spouse context. The same can be said of whether the tax burden is
being unfairly imposed on the requesting spouse, but it is important to the
courts whether the requesting spouse had knowledge of the tax deficiency.
The nature of the non-requesting spouse is less important. Whether the
requesting spouse is abused appears to matter to many judges, but the sample
is small. Divorce or separation decrees assigning liability can also operate as
secondary evidence but will rarely decide a case.
Although these guidelines can be gleaned from the cases, in their
opinions judges are neither crafting precise definitions of many of these
terms nor defining the relative importance of each. Clearer guidance needs to
be established by Congress, and definitions by the Treasury Department, to
provide more accurate predictive power for individual cases. Despite these
difficulties, this article can respond to the fear that the complexities of
section 6015 has meant that the innocent spouse regime "degenerate[d] into a
global subjective test of whether the spouse seeking relief can move the
judge to sympathy." 366 For those claims that are twice denied by the IRS but
progress to the courts, the taxpayers who are most likely to win are those for
whom Congress intended to provide relief, while spouses like Susan Wilson
are often, but not always, denied.
364. See notes 58-68.
365. Id.
366. Beck, Failure, supra note 20, at 942.
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The problem remains that litigating relief can be complicated and
costly for both taxpayers and the government. As with all equity claims, the
factors considered by the courts may be inconsistently applied. As a result,
some within Congress are unsatisfied with current relief, or at least the
complaints innocent spouse relief receives, and propose further liberalizing
section 6015. Whether the IRS's recently liberalized factors for section
6015(f) relief are a response to this new desire or are consistent with
Congress's 1998 intent for that section is left for a later day. Unless clarity of
purpose and in operation is provided for in any new legislation, however, a
further liberalized law is likely to face the same criticism as the law of the
past, regardless of courts' ability to implement Congress's desires.
367. Laura Saunders, A New Push to Protect Spouses, WALL ST. J., May 28,
2011, at B9.
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